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Abstract 
Asia has truly experienced spectacular economic growth over the past 15 years. However, 
this economic progress has come at a high cost. It has led to unprecedented 
environmental consequences. The ecological footprint shows that, despite the fact that 
one-fifth of the population in Asia still lives on less than US$ 1 per day (PPP-adjusted), 
the region is already living beyond its ecological carrying capacity. The region is facing a 
dilemma. On the one hand, continued economic growth is needed to alleviate the poverty 
of the two-thirds of the world’s poor living in this region. On the other hand, that 
economic growth will further place tremendous strains on the natural environment. 
 
In order to extricate itself from this difficult position, the region needs to shift the 
conventional pattern of “develop first and then treat the pollution” to a different trajectory 
of sustainable development. To that end, this paper examines a variety of policy 
responses at national, regional and international levels to deal with growing concerns 
about the environmental challenges in Asia in order to help to put the region on a more 
sustainable development path. In the context of national responses, special attention is 
paid to the following issues: coordination between the central and local governments, 
market-based environmental instruments and industrial policies, tougher emissions 
standards for mobile and stationary sources and for fuel quality, policies to promote 
energy efficiency and the use of clean energy and biofuels, the integration of 
environmental policies with economic and sectoral policies, and engagement of the 
private sector through e.g., ecolabelling, green government procurement, corporate 
ratings and disclosure programs, and drawing the support of financial institutions to 
promote improved corporate environmental performance. It is concluded that having the 
right policy mix, coupled with strengthened cooperation at national, local and regional 
levels, will ensure continuing economic growth in the region without compromising its 
limited ecological carrying capacity and environmental quality.  
 
 
Keywords: Energy policy; Market-based environmental instruments; Asia 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Asia has truly experienced spectacular economic growth over the past 15 years. Some 
270 million people have been raised out of poverty between 1990 and 2004. However, 
this economic progress has come at a high cost. Asia relies heavily on coal as its main 
commercial energy. Coal consumption in developing Asian countries accounts for 44% 
of their total primary energy and 57% of their total commercial energy consumption in 
2004, in comparison with the corresponding world average of 25% and 28% (IEA, 
2006a). This coal dominance in the energy mix in developing Asia and inefficiencies in 
production and use of energy and resources, combined with rapid urbanization and 
motorization, have led to unprecedented environmental consequences. An ongoing study 
by the Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities (2006) shows that, despite that the levels of 
air pollution in Asian cities show downward trends over time, they regularly exceed the 
World Health Organization (WHO) recommended guidelines as well as national air 
quality standards (Figure 1). Air pollution levels in the most populated cities in this 
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region are even reported to be among the highest in the world and continue to climb. 
Developing Asian countries are confronted with indoor air pollution from burning solid 
fuels as well. The WHO’s first ever country-by-country analysis shows that indoor air 
pollution is to blame for a total of about one million deaths in Asia, about 65% of the 
world’s total (Table 1). Acid rain persists in this region, despite significant efforts 
towards reducing acidifying gas emissions. Periodic transboundary haze events are also 
prevalent in Southeast Asia. In this subregion, illegal forest resource exploitation also 
continues to be a problem. Many Asian countries are experiencing severe and in some 
cases, accelerating soil erosion, desertification and overgrazing in grasslands. Dust and 
sandstorms are now occurring more frequently than in the past, and are growing in scope 
and intensity in Northeast Asia (UNEP, 2004 and 2005). Many developing Asian 
countries are confronted with water scarcity and water pollution (UNESCAP, 2006). On 
top of these environmental stresses, projected global climate change is expected to pose 
the additional threats to Asia (IPCC, 2007). 
 
The ecological footprint shows that, despite the fact that one-fifth of the population in 
Asia still lives on less than US$ 1 per day (PPP-adjusted), this region is already living 
beyond its ecological carrying capacity. The region is facing a dilemma. On the one hand, 
continued economic growth is needed to alleviate the poverty of the two-thirds of the 
world’s poor living in this region. On the other hand, that economic growth will further 
place tremendous strains on the natural environment. Thus, it is very important for the 
region to have the right policy mix to ensure continuing economic growth without 
compromising its environmental quality.  
 
Following an introduction, Section 2 discusses major causes for environmental 
degradation in Asia. Section 3 examines responses, both at national and international 
levels, to deal with growing concerns about the environmental challenges in Asia in order 
to help to put the region on a more sustainable development path. The final section 
presents key findings and conclusions. 
 
 
 
Figure 1  Trends of Major Criteria Air Pollutants (1993-2004) 
Source: Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities (2006). 
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Table 1  Estimated Deaths Caused by Indoor and Outdoor Air Pollution in 2002 
 
Indoor Air Pollution Outdoor Air Pollution  
Population 
using solid 
fuel (%) 
Deaths per 
year* 
Annual PM10 
(µg/m3) 
Deaths per year
Bangladesh 
Cambodia 
China 
DPR Korea 
India 
Indonesia 
Japan 
Lao PDR 
Malaysia 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Republic of Korea 
Singapore 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
ASIA 
89 
>95 
80 
no data 
82 
72 
<5 
>95 
<5 
>95 
81 
81 
45 
<5 
<5 
67 
72 
70 
77 
46,000 
1,600 
380,700 
- 
407,100 
15,300 
- 
2,400 
<100 
14,700 
7,500 
70,700 
6,900 
- 
- 
3,100 
4,600 
10,600 
971,200 
157 
51 
80 
88 
84 
114 
33 
25 
28 
75 
161 
165 
34 
43 
48 
93 
77 
66 
 
8,200 
200 
275,600 
4,900 
120,600 
28,800 
23,800 
<100 
500 
3,900 
700 
28,700 
3,900 
6,800 
1,000 
1,000 
2,800 
6,300 
517,700 
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WORLD 52 1,497,000 61 865,000 
 
* For a country either with no data on the use of solid fuel or where less than 5% of its 
population use solid fuels, a national burden of disease assessment from indoor air 
pollution was not undertaken. In the latter case, that is because the method is not sensitive 
enough to provide reliable estimates. 
Sources: WHO (2007a and 2007b). 
 
 
2. Major Causes of Environmental Degradation in Asia 
Much of the environmental degradation in Asia occurs as a result of market failures, 
inefficiency in production and use of energy and resources, local governments’ inability 
or non-cooperation, lack of integrated planning, and weak environmental regulatory 
agencies. 
 
The prices of energy resources have been kept low in developing Asian countries, and 
subsiding fossil fuels is a quite common practice in this region, although the levels of 
these subsidies have been cut in some countries over the past years. In terms of fuels, the 
biggest subsidies in absolute (dollar) terms go to oil products in many countries (Figure 
2). Iran has the biggest oil subsidies estimated at about US$ 24 billion. This is largely 
because Iran continues to heavily subsidize transport fuels (i.e. gasoline and diesel) while 
other countries have significantly cut subsidies to these fuels in percentage terms in 
recent years (Table 2). This oil subsidy, combined with other energy subsidies, puts the 
total Iranian subsidies at the estimated US$ 37 billion in 2005, which are equal to about 
20% of GDP in 2005 – by far the highest in the world, and are more than all energy 
subsidies (estimated at US$ 20-30 billion per year) in the OECD countries as a whole 
(IEA, 2006a and 2006b). Indonesia has the second largest oil subsidies. ADB (2005a) 
estimates that annual oil subsidies in Indonesia averaged US$ 6 billion between 2000 and 
2005. With the increases in would oil prices, oil subsidies in Indonesia were projected to 
have ballooned to US$ 6.8 billion in 2004 and more than US$ 12 billion in 2005 – equal 
to 5% of GDP and almost a third of the total government spending (ADB, 2005a; IEA, 
2006a and 2006b). In percentage terms, under-pricing is the biggest for natural gas. On 
average, consumers in the countries listed in Table 2 pay less than half the true economic 
value of the gas that they use. Electricity subsidies are less prevalent, but are large in 
some countries (IEA, 2006a).  
 
Figure 2  Economic Value of Energy Subsidies in non-OECD Countries in 2005 
Source: IEA (2006a). 
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Table 2  Consumption Subsidy as Percentage of Reference Energy Price in non-OECD Countries in 2005 
 
 Gasoline Diesel Kerosene LPG Light Fuel 
Oil 
Heavy 
Fuel 
Oil 
Natural 
Gas 
Coal Electricity 
China 5 13 3 18 0 0 45 17 0 
Chinese Taipei 0 0 0 9 27 6 0 5 0 
India 0 0 47 26 0 0 70 0 5 
Indonesia 24 54 58 30 35 n.a. 0 58 13 
Malaysia 26 37 0 33 9 0 n.a. n.a. 5 
Thailand 0 16 0 35 0 0 65 57 10 
Pakistan 0 28 19 n.a. 21 n.a. 59 0 n.a. 
Philippines 0 0 5 0 34 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 
Vietnam 6 26 5 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 14 
Iran 82 96 76 67 32 73 66 0 30 
Saudi Arabia 51 81 6 n.a. 81 n.a. 89 n.a. 54 
Egypt 65 80 88 94 80 71 76 0 4 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a. 0 41 
Nigeria 19 17 42 6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 24 
Brazil 0 0 n.a. 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 
Argentina 20 5 0 0 0 0 58 n.a. 27 
Venezuela 90 96 0 82 94 84 n.a. n.a. 25 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 16 57 0 34 
Kazakhstan 28 20 n.a. n.a. 49 48 83 86 24 
Ukraine 0 23 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 83 36 27 
Weighted 
Average 
 
1 
 
15 
 
27 
 
19 
 
6 
 
10 
 
57 
 
12 
 
8 
n.a.: not available. 
Note: Based on weighted average subsidies and prices across final sectors for each fuel. Cross-subsidies between sectors are, therefore, 
not included. 
Source: IEA (2006a).
 
As a result of energy subsidies, energy prices in developing Asian countries don’t even 
reflect the cost of production. Certainly they reflect neither the situation of supply and 
demand on the market, nor the scarcity of energy and resources. They also do not 
incorporate externalities such as environmental and health impacts. This has led to 
inefficient production and use of energy and resources, creates no incentive for energy 
and resource conservation, and gives rise to quite amount of emissions that can otherwise 
be avoided if subsidies are removed and resource prices get right. 
 
Inefficiencies in production and use of energy and resources and in pollution reduction 
are widespread within the region. This pattern is reflected both in individual sectors of 
the economy, such as energy production and transportation in which energy-intensive and 
highly polluting outdated technologies and modes are still used, and in the economy as a 
whole. As indicated in Figure 3, energy use per unit of GDP, a key indicator of patterns 
of energy use, is still high in many developing Asian countries, and even increased in 
countries such as Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, South Korean and Thailand between 
1990 and 2004. Indonesia and Pakistan consumed almost the same amount of energy per 
unit of GDP as they were in 1990. In the meantime, as indicated in Figure 4, the rate of 
energy efficiency improvement in IEA countries has been less than 1% per year since 
1990 – much lower than in previous decades (IEA, 2007a).This explains why Australia, 
the host country of the APEC Leaders Summit in September 2007, proposed that all 21 
APEC economies, regardless of whether they are developed and developing economies, 
agree to reduce energy intensity by at least 25% by 2030, but in the end the leaders only 
agreed in the Sydney APEC Leaders’ Declaration on Climate Change Energy Security 
and Clean Development to work towards achieving an APEC-wide (emphasis added) 
aspirational goal in energy intensity by at least 25% by 2030, relative to 2005 levels 
(Zhang, 2007e).  
 
For a pollution indicator like the amount of CO2 emitted per unit of GDP, as indicated in 
Figure 5, many Asian countries reduced the CO2 intensities of their economies over the 
period 1990-2003. However, there were still quite a few countries, such as Nepal, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam that emitted more CO2 per unit 
of GDP in 2003 than they were in 1990. 
 
 
Figure 3  Energy Use per Unit of GDP in the Selected Asia Pacific Countries, 1990-
2004 (Tons of oil equivalent/million 2000 US$) 
Source: Drawn based on data from the World Bank (2007). 
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Figure 4  The Rates of both Energy Efficiency Improvement and Increase in Energy 
Use in IEA Countries, 1973-2004 
Source: IEA (2007a). 
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Figure 5  CO2 Emitted per unit of GDP in the Selected Asia Pacific Countries, 1990-
2003 
(Tons of carbon dioxide per million 2000 US$) 
Source: Drawn based on data from the World Resources Institute (2007). 
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Local governments’ inability, or non-cooperation, has been a major reason for the failure 
to meet energy efficiency and environmental goals set by the national governments. The 
national government of China has implemented policies to shut down plants that are 
inefficient and highly polluting, and to keep the frenzied expansion of offending 
industries under control. Local officials strongly resist, because these companies provide 
jobs and create tax revenues as well as personal payoffs. Forcing companies out of 
business could even trigger local unrest. As an example, September 2006, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s top economic planning agency, 
ordered provincial governments to raise power tariffs for eight energy-guzzling industries 
including cement, aluminum, iron and steel, and ferroalloy. However it is reported that by 
mid-April 2007, not only had many local governments failed to implement the 
differentiated tariffs that charge more for companies classified as “eliminated types” or 
“restrained types” in these industries, but 14 of them even continued to offer preferential 
power tariffs for such industries (Zhang, 2007a, 2007d and 2007f).  
 
Effectively addressing environmental problems not only needs to get local governments 
involved, but also involves many line ministries and multi-sectors. But the presence of a 
multitude of institutions with multiple objectives creates coordination problems. As a 
result of this institutional failure and high transaction costs, environmental goals and 
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performance requirements, even if they were identified, are rarely integrated into the 
overall economic or sectoral policies, thus undermining their effectiveness during 
implementation. 
 
Weak environmental regulatory agencies also have a large part to play for environmental 
degradation in this region. On the one hand, environmental protection in the region is 
regarded as a policy goal to be pursued exclusively within environmental ministries or 
equivalent agencies. Few countries effectively mobilize other line ministries to this 
challenging task. On the other hand, although there are so many environmental 
regulations, they only look good on paper. Environmental ministries or equivalent 
agencies in the region are often ill-equipped either to enforce existing regulations or to 
design, implement, monitor, inspect and enforce new effective environmental polices. 
  
The State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) of China was for years seen as a 
powerless entity. While China’s environmental regulatory agency was given a new lease 
on life and was elevated from a lowly vice-ministry rank to full ministerial status, the 
SEPA still does not have the authority to suspend proposed projects violating 
environmental laws and regulations or to remove officials who should be held 
accountable for this noncompliance. It also lacks the authority to manage local 
environmental bureaus (Zhang, 2007a).  
 
In case the SEPA decides to impose a penalty on violators of EIA (environmental impact 
assessment) laws and regulations, as indicated in Table 3, the maximum fine at its 
disposal is just 200,000 yuan (about US$25,000). Even for environmental accidents as 
serious as the Songhuajing River spill in November 2005 in Northern China, the incident 
that had unprecedented international implications as well as domestic social, economic 
and environmental ramifications, the maximum fine by China’s current environmental 
laws is just one million yuan, which was actually imposed one year after that incident. 
Moreover, the fine is only allowed to be imposed once (Zhang, 2007a, 2007d and 2007f). 
As a result, this low and one-off penalty is hardly a deterrent to environmental offenders. 
To make things worse, even these weak punishments empowered by current 
environmental laws are still weakly enforced in China because environmental protection 
agencies at all levels of the governments are underfunded and inadequately staffed. 
 
Table 3  Maximum Fines by Category of Violators of Environmental Laws and 
Regulations in China 
 
 Applicable Laws Maximum Fines 
Allowed (10000 Yuan) 
Exceed the pollution limit 
 
Air pollution accidents 
 
EIA violators, imposed only 
after the grace period 
Extraordinarily 
Atmosphere Pollution 
Prevention and Control Act 
Atmosphere Pollution 
Prevention and Control Act 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) Law 
Water Pollution Prevention and 
 
10 
 
50 
 
20 
 
 11
environmental accidents Control Act 100 
 
Sources: Zhang (2007d and 2007f). 
 
 
3. National and Regional Reponses 
Asia Pacific is less generously endowed with natural resources than other parts of the 
world. As shown in Table 4, its total biological production capacity per year (termed as 
biocapacity – nature’s ability of a country to renew depleted resources) on a per capita 
basis is the lowest of all regions, and is only about 40% of the world’s average. Despite 
the fact that one-fifth of the population in Asia still lives on less than US$ 1 per day 
(PPP-adjusted), the ecological footprint, a measure of how much land and water area 
required to produce all the resources consumed and to absorb all the wastes generated per 
year under prevailing technology, shows that this region already exceeds its biocapacity. 
Put another way, the region is already living beyond its ecological carrying capacity. As 
shown in Figure 6, 13 countries or over 60% of countries in this region already run the 
ecological deficits (namely, footprint minus biocapacity is negative; if the sign is positive, 
then country has an ecological reserve.). Compared with other regions like North 
America and European Union which also face ecological deficits but are well developed, 
Asia has to continue its rapid economic growth in order to alleviate the poverty of the 
two-thirds of the world’s poor living in this region. This will further place tremendous 
strains on the natural environment. Thus, it is of paramount importance to the region to 
cooperate at national, local and regional levels and have the right policy mix to ensure 
continuing economic growth without compromising its limited ecological carrying 
capacity and environmental quality.  
  
  
Table 4  Per Capita Ecological Biocapacity, Footprint and Deficits/Reserves by 
Region in 2003 
 
Ecological Deficit or Reserve Region Biocapacity
(Hectares) 
Ecological 
Footprint 
(Hectares) 
Value (Hectares) % of 
biocapacity
Asia Pacific 
Africa 
Latin America 
Middle East and 
Central Asia 
North America 
European Union 25 
The Rest of Europe 
0.7 
1.3 
5.4 
 
1.0 
5.7 
2.2 
4.6 
1.3 
1.1 
2.0 
 
2.2 
9.4 
4.8 
3.8 
-0.6 
+0.2 
+3.4 
 
-1.2 
-3.7 
-2.6 
+0.8 
-86 
+15 
+62 
 
-120 
-65 
-118 
+17 
World 1.8 2.2 -0.5 -28 
 
Notes: + Ecological reserve; - Ecological deficit. 
Source: Global Footprint Network (2007).  
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Figure 6  Per Capita Ecological Biocapacity, Footprint and Deficits/Reserves in the 
Selected Asia Pacific Countries in 2003 (Hectares) 
Per capita ecological footprint (2003)
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10 12 14 16
 13
                                                                    
 
  Source: Drawn based on date from Global Footprint Network (2007). 
Per capita ecological deficits and surpluses (2003)
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
Total
New Zealand 
Nepal
Myanmar
Mongolia 
Malaysia
Laos
Korea Republic
Korea DPR 
Japan
Indonesia
China
India
Cambodia
Bangladesh 
Australia
0 2 4 6 8 10-6 -4 -2
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Get Local Governments and Polluting Companies Cooperation 
Confronted with the rising costs of environmental degradation associated with rapid 
economic growth, the central governments in Asian countries have gradually recognized 
that the conventional path of encouraging economic growth at the expense of the 
environment has to be changed. They are convinced of the need to clean up their 
countries’ environmental act. Accordingly, they set environmental goals and 
environmental performance requirements. But they are not adequately equipped with 
their tasks. As a result, poor compliance and weak enforcement are common in this 
region. Correcting such a problem requires a major investment in strengthening the 
institutions of environmental governance to ensure that they have the adequate 
institutional, financial and technical capabilities to do the job. This is a necessary step, 
but not enough. We need the full participation of all stakeholders in protecting the 
environment. In this regard, local government’s cooperation is crucial to the overall 
outcomes. As often be the case, what the center wants isn’t necessarily what the center 
gets. An old Chinese saying goes, “The mountains are high, and the emperor is far away”. 
Central governments need to let go of the notion that they should or even can do it all. 
Clearly, the central governments need local officials’ cooperation to get these policies 
implemented. Otherwise, there is no use to set and defend stringent national 
environmental goals if the central governments are unable to get local governments 
cooperation. 
 
To gain local officials’ cooperation on the environmental issues, incentives need to be 
provided. Over the past decades, many Asian countries have decentralized in the 
allocation and responsibility and have shifted control over resources and decision-making 
to local governments. This devolution of decision-making to local levels has placed 
environmental stewardship in the hands of local officials who are more concerned with 
economic growth than the environment. Therefore, effective environmental protection 
must be placed in this context of government decentralization.  
 
Under the current evaluation criterion for officials in China, local officials typically,have 
been promoted based on how fast they expand their local economies. That has created an 
incentive for officials to tempt to disregard the environmental costs of economic growth. 
To correct this distorted view of local officials’ accomplishments and to implant 
environmental consequences in their minds, environmental performance has to be 
considered as well. If environmental quality does not get improved during the official’s 
tenure, that official should not be promoted. This will help the local officials realize that 
they should take their jobs seriously because they have a very real stake in meeting 
environmental goals.  
 
To that end, the central government of China has been using a variety of the tactics to 
incentivize local governments. Starting in 1997, the SEPA runs a model environmental 
city program. Any city that meets 32 different SEPA-specified environmental indicators 
is awarded the title. Out of 661 cities in China, to date, 62 have been placed on the honor 
roll (Zhang, 2007a, 2007b and 2007f).  
 
To further push local governments on the environmental front, for the first time, on July 
13, 2004, the SEPA announced its blacklist of the ten most polluted cities to discourage 
environmentally irresponsible decisions. That shocked local officials who had always 
worked on the assumption that “evil deeds” very seldom saw the light of day (Zhang, 
2007a and 2007b). This public disclosure works effectively because it puts more pressure 
on local officials to take responsibility for the health of their people and to take action. 
Since 2006, the black list is expanded to include cities with air quality below the class III 
standard designed for industrial areas. According to the latest evaluation on 595 Chinese 
cities’ environmental quality in 2006, released on June 11, 2007, there were still 39 cities, 
four less than the number in 2005, on SEPA’s black list, meaning that these cities 
suffered severe air pollution (SEPA, 2007a). Among the blacklisted cities, seven were in 
North China’s Shanxi Province, the country’s largest coal supplier, and seven in 
Northeast China’s Liaoning Province, the base for heavy industries. 
 
Aimed to help the general public and officials alike to understand how seriously China 
confronts the rising costs of environmental degradation associated with its rapid 
economic growth, in March 2004, the SEPA and the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China jointly launched the project on the Green GDP Accounting Research, trying to 
incorporate environmental degradation into the accounting of traditional GDP to give a 
more realistic picture of the health of the economy. In September 2006, they jointly 
released the first-ever report on economic costs of pollution. Despite the shortcomings in 
basic data, methodologies and the coverage of items, this study estimates that the 
environmental pollution still costs China 511 billion yuan (around US$ 64 billion), or 
3.05% of GDP in 2004 (SEPA and NBS, 2006). This sends a warning signal that China’s 
rampant environmental pollution problem is undermining its long-term economic growth. 
The SEPA is taking a step further, promoting to use the calculated green GDP instead of 
traditional GDP as the economic criterion to evaluate the real performance of local 
officials. 
 
To further enhance the environmental awareness of local officials, the SEPA has 
tightened approval of construction projects by implementing the regional permit 
restrictions. The so-called regional permit restrictions are based on an ancient Chinese 
punishment of incriminating relatives and associates related to the main suspect. On 
January 10, 2007, the SEPA made an unprecedented move, suspending EIA approval of 
any new construction projects in four cities (Tangshan in Hebei Province, Luliang in 
Shanxi Province, Liupanshui in Guizhou Province, and Laiwu in Shandong Province) and 
four major national power-generating groups (Datang International, Huaneng Group, 
China Huadian Corp, and China Guodian Corp) until they bring their existing facilities 
into compliance with environmental regulations. Once their EIA approval rights are 
suspended, no new construction projects are allowed to be built in these cities and by 
these power-generating groups until all violators are in compliance with environmental 
regulations. Given that China’s economy is investment-driven, local governments are 
fully aware of the consequences of the suspension of their right to approve new 
construction projects. To disregard the environmental problems in their regions now can 
cost them a lot (Zhang, 2007a).  
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In fact, this is not for the first time for the SEPA to impose administrative measures to 
punish offenders. Since January 2005, the SEPA has unleashed a series of the so-called 
environmental protection storms. Its first ever such a storm unleashed on January 18, 
2005, blacklisted 30 industrial projects worth 119.7 billion yuan. Many of these projects 
were considered the so-called “national key projects” approved by the powerful NDRC, 
China’s top economic planning agency. While these projects themselves were not 
necessarily highly polluting, the SEPA called for a halt to these industrial projects, on the 
ground that they had not undergone proper environmental impact assessments. This first 
environmental protection storm served as a public education campaign, increasing the 
awareness of the EIA law. In the second environmental storm in 2006, the EIA law is 
further strengthened, taking it from project level to the deeper level of planning. 163 
proposed projects worth 774.6 billion yuan were put on hold on enforcing EIA law alone. 
But, the restriction of regional permits this time is the strictest administrative measure 
ever taken by the SEPA in its 30 years of existence (Zhang, 2007a and 2007b).  
 
The underlying reason for suspending EIA approval rights is thought to be the desire to 
promote technology upgrading, industrial restructuring and sustainable development. 
Whether it becomes an effective means depends on how local governments and 
companies succeed in changing their attitudes and practices and whether local 
environmental protection agencies work together with the national agency. Otherwise, 
suspending the approval rights only has temporary effects, but does not lead to a long-
term efficacy (Zhang, 2007a and 2007b). 
 
Thus far, the new regional permit restrictions seem to be effective. Only one month after 
the restrictions suspended approval rights for the four cities, one city, Laiwu, quickly 
responded to the SEPA warnings and recovered its rights; and only two months after the 
suspension, Huaneng Group and China Guodian Corp, the two national power-generating 
groups, came into compliance and recovered their rights (Zhang, 2007a). 
 
China launched the bulletin system to release data on energy use per unit of GDP and 
other indicators by provincial region in 2006 (People’s Daily, 2005). According to the 
first Bulletin on Energy Use per Unit of GDP and other Indicators for 2006, which was 
released in July 2007, only Beijing met energy-saving and emissions-cutting goals in 
2006, cutting its energy use per unit of GDP by 5.25%, followed by Tianjin, another 
metropolitan city in China, with the energy intensity reduction of 3.98% (NBS et al., 
2007).2 The SEPA could use its newly-asserted power to suspend the right to approve 
new construction projects in those provinces if they continue noncompliance with the 
energy-saving and environmental goals (Zhang, 2007a). 
 
In addition to this distorted evaluation criterion for officials, objectively speaking, the 
current fiscal system in China plays a part in driving local governments to seek higher 
                                                 
2 Beijing is the first provincial region in China to establish in 2006 the bulletin system to 
release data on energy use and water use per unit of GDP, quarterly releasing these and 
other indicators by county. See Zhang (2007a, 2007d and 2007f) for detailed discussion 
on why Beijing met but the country missed the energy-saving goals. 
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GDP growths because that tax-sharing system makes it hard to reconcile the interests of 
the central and local governments. Since the tax-sharing system was adopted in China in 
1994, taxes are grouped into taxes collected by the central government, taxes collected by 
local governments, and taxes shared between the central and local governments. All those 
taxes that have steady sources and broad bases and are easily collected, such as 
consumption tax, tariffs, vehicle purchase tax, are assigned to the central government. 
VAT and income tax are split between the central and local governments, with 75% of 
VAT and 60% of income tax going to the central government. As a result, the central 
government revenue increased by 200% in 1994 relative to its 1993 level. This led the 
share of the central government in the total government revenue to go up to 55.7% in 
1994 from 22.0% in the previous year (see Table 5). In the meantime, the share of the 
central government in the total government expenditure just rose by 2%. By 2006, local 
governments only accounted for 47.2% of the total government revenue, but their 
expenditure accounted for 75.3% of the total government expenditure in China. To enable 
to pay their expenditure for culture and education, supporting agricultural production, 
social security subsidiary, etc, local governments have little choice to focus on local 
development and GDP. That will in turn enable them to enlarge their tax revenue by 
collecting urban maintenance and development tax, contract tax, arable land occupation 
tax, urban land use tax, etc. 
 
 
Table 5  Shares of the Central and Local Governments in the Government Revenue 
and Expenditure in China 
 
Government Revenue Government Expenditure  
Central 
Government 
(%) 
Local 
Governments 
(%) 
Central 
Government 
(%) 
Local 
Governments 
(%) 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
22.0 
55.7 
52.2 
49.4 
48.9 
49.5 
51.1 
52.2 
52.4 
55.0 
54.6 
54.9 
52.3 
52.8 
78.0 
44.3 
47.8 
50.6 
51.1 
50.5 
48.9 
47.8 
47.6 
45.0 
45.4 
45.1 
47.7 
47.2 
28.3 
30.3 
29.2 
27.1 
27.4 
28.9 
31.5 
34.7 
30.5 
30.7 
30.1 
27.7 
25.9 
24.7 
71.7 
69.7 
70.8 
72.9 
72.6 
71.1 
68.5 
65.3 
69.5 
69.3 
69.9 
72.3 
74.1 
75.3 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007). 
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Another example of the improper tax-sharing scheme in China is related to the 
aforementioned differentiated tariffs. The NDRC (2006c) ordered provincial 
governments to raise power tariffs for eight energy-guzzling industries from October 1, 
2006 onwards (see Table 6), but many local governments failed to implement the 
differentiated tariffs that charge more for companies classified as “eliminated types” or 
“restrained types” in these industries, with 14 of them even continuing to offer 
preferential power tariffs for such industries (Zhang, 2007a, 2007d and 2007f). The 
reason for this failure is the lack of incentive for local governments to implement this 
policy, because all the revenue collected from these additional charges go to the central 
government (Zhang, 2007f). To provide incentive for local governments, these revenue 
should be assigned to local governments, but the central government requires local 
governments to use the revenue specifically for industrial upgrading, energy saving and 
emissions cutting. 
 
 
Table 6  Differentiated Tariffs for Eight Energy-guzzling Industries in China 
 
 Existing 
Additional 
Charge 
(Yuan/kWh) 
Additional 
Charge since 
October 1, 
2006 
(Yuan/kWh) 
Additional 
Charge since 
January 1, 
2007 
(Yuan/kWh) 
Additional 
Charge since 
January 1, 
2008 
(Yuan/kWh) 
Eliminated 
types 
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 Eight 
energy-
guzzling 
industries 
Restrained 
types 
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 
 
Source: NDRC (2006c). 
 
 
Economic Policies 
Having the right economic policies is crucial because it sends clear signals to both 
producers and consumers of energy. Given the widespread use of fossil fuel subsidies in 
developing Asian region, removing these subsidies is essential to provide incentives for 
efficient fuel use and adoption of clean technologies that reduce emissions at sources. By 
definition, a subsidy lowers the cost of production, increases the price received by 
producers or lowers the price paid by consumers. By lowering the prices of fossil fuels, 
such fossil fuel subsidies not only are widely considered to distort international trade, but 
also increase the amount of such fuels consumed and thus the amount of harmful 
emissions (Zhang and Assunção, 2004). China, Indonesia and Malaysia are among the 
developing Asian countries that have since 2005 raised domestic energy prices to bring 
them more into line with international prices. This has led to sharp fall in overall energy 
subsidies in these countries despite rising international prices. For example, China cut its 
total energy subsidies to around US$ 11 billion in 2006 (IEA, 2007b). This corresponds 
to a reduction of 58% compared to its 2005 level of around US$ 26 billion (see Figure 2). 
Despite this is long-awaited and encouraging, removing such subsidies is but a first step 
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in getting the energy prices right. Further steps include incorporating the costs of 
resources themselves to reflect their scarcity and internalizing the costs of externalities. 
For example, current royalties on coal resources in China are based on production. That is, 
a coal miner pays certain amount of fees for each ton of coal produced. As a result, once 
a coal miner obtains mining permits, it mines recklessly. This irresponsible mining 
behavior is very common for small coal mines, and has led to a severe waste of coal 
resources, even to the destruction of coal resources. As would be expected, the coal 
recovery rate is reported to be only 10-15% for small coal mines. For the country as a 
whole, the average recovery rate is about 30%,3 only 60% of the advanced level abroad 
(He, 2006). To avoid wasteful production of coal, current way in levying royalties on 
coal resources in China should be changed. The rational royalties on coal resources 
should be indexed with both the reserves and recovery rate of coal mines. 
 
Market-based instruments, such as pollution charges, green taxes, tradeable petmits, and 
penalties for the infringement of environmental regulations, are common ways to 
internalize externality costs into the market prices. Many Asian countries have 
traditionally relied on rigid command-and-control (CAC) approaches. With the poor 
environmental performance of such approaches and the cost and complexity associated 
with their implementation, more and more countries in this region are transforming from 
current reliance on CAC regulations to market-based policy instruments. The added 
pollution charges will be imposed on polluting companies as a simple cost of doing 
business that can be reduced by cutting pollution. This is seen to increase not only cost-
effectiveness but also flexibility in complying with the set environmental regulations. 
 
By amending the 1987 Atmospheric Pollution Prevention and Control Act in August 
1995, which newly added SO2 emissions from coal combustion as the regulated pollutant, 
China has since 1996 started levying the charges for SO2 emissions in the so-called Two 
Control Zones4 based on the total quantity of emissions and at the rate of 0.20 Yuan per 
kilo of pollution equivalent (Qian and Zhang, 1998; Yu, 2006). As indicated in Table 7, 
since July 1, 2003, this charge was applied nationwide and the level of this charge was 
raised step by step. From July 1, 2005 onwards, the charge was applied at the level of 
0.60 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent. The pollutants that are subject to pollution 
charges are broadened to include NOx as well, which is charged at the rate of 0.60 Yuan 
per kilo of pollution equivalent since July 1, 2004 (SPDC et al., 2003). To help to meet 
the energy saving and environmental control goals set for the 11th five-year economic 
plan, the Chinese government recently plans by three steps to double the charges for SO2 
                                                 
3 Coal recovery rates differ with scale of mines, the level of mining technologies, and 
type of mines. For key state-owned coal mines, the rate is 50%. The corresponding figure 
for surface mines reaches as high as 95%. But their output only accounts for 4.5% of the 
national total production (He, 2006). 
4 The so-called Two Control Zones refer to acid rain control zone and SO2 control zone. 
The former mainly covers the southern and southwestern parts of China where 
precipitation is acid most of the time, whereas the latter covers the northeastern and 
eastern parts of the country where SO2 emissions are very intensive but the acid rain is 
not apparent partly because of the alkaline soils in these areas. 
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emissions from current level to 1.2 Yuan per kilo of pollutant equivalent within the next 
three years (The State Council, 2007). Local governments are allowed to raise pollution 
charges above the national levels. Since 1999, Beijing levied charges 1.2 Yuan per kilo of 
pollution equivalent for SO2 emissions from coals of high sulfur content (SPDC et al., 
2003). Jiangshu Province raised charges for SO2 emissions from current level of 0.6 to 
1.2 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent from July 1, 2007 onwards, three years ahead of 
the national schedule (People Net, 2007; Sinanet, 2007a).  
 
 
Table 7  Levels of Charges for Atmospheric Pollutants in China 
 
Pollutants Staring Time Levels of Charge 
(Yuan/kilo pollution 
equivalent) 
 
SO2 emissions 
July 1, 2003 
July 1, 2004 
July 1, 2005 
July 1, 2010 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
1.2 
NOx emissions July 1, 2003 
July 1, 2004 
0 
0.6 
 
Sources: SPDC et al. (2003); The State Council (2007). 
 
No doubt, economic instruments such as pollution charges increase the costs of 
production, and thus provide positive incentives to abate emissions. However, these 
economic instruments don’t work to their full potential, although they have a solid 
economic foundation. In theory, cost-conscious managers will generally tolerate pollution 
up to the point where the expected penalty for pollution becomes greater than the cost of 
controlling emissions. However, if the charges and fines are set too low as have been the 
case in many developing countries,5 many polluting companies see their compliance 
costs higher than the fines, and accordingly choose to pay the fines rather than to reduce 
their pollution. As discussed in Section 2, the low penalty is hardly a deterren
environmental offenders in China. To change this situation, pollution charges should be 
raised to reflect the cost of abating pollution, and the fines for offenders should be set 
higher than the abatement cost.
t to 
                                                
6 This two together will really create incentive for 
pollution reduction. 
 
 
5 Even for the aforementioned case of Jiangshu Province, where the charges for SO2 
emissions at 1.2 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent were levied from July 1, 2007 
onwards, three years ahead of China’s national schedule, this charge is still less than half 
of the real abatement cost, which is reported to be 3 Yuan per kilo of pollution equivalent 
for abating SO2 emissions from coal-fired power plants (Sinanet, 2007a). 
6 The NDRC, the top planning agency in China, plans to raise pollution charges 
equivalent to the cost of pollution treatment in three years (China News Net, 2007). 
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In addition to market-based environmental instruments, governments are exploring 
industrial policies to promote industrial upgrading and energy conservation. With surge 
in energy use in heavy industry, China’s Ministry of Finance and the State 
Administration of Taxation started levying export taxes from November 2006 on energy 
and resource intensive products to discourage exports that rely heavily on energy and 
resources and to save scarce energy and resources. This includes a 5% export tax on oil, 
coal and coke, a 10% tax on to non-ferrous metals, some minerals and 27 other iron and 
steel products, and a 15% tax charged on copper, nickel, aluminum and other 
metallurgical products. Simultaneously, imports tariffs on a range of items, including 26 
energy and resource products such as oil, coal and aluminum, were cut from their current 
levels of 3-6% to 0-3% (Agence France-Presse, 2006). From July 1, 2007, China’s 
Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation (2007) eliminated or cut 
export tax rebates for 2831 exported items. This is considered as the boldest move to rein 
in exports since China joined the World Trade Organization in December 2001. Among 
the affected items, which account for 37% of all traded products, are 553 “highly energy-
consuming, highly-polluting and resource-intensive products”, such as cement, fertilizer 
and non-ferrous metals, whose export tax rebates were completely eliminated. This 
policy will help to enhance energy efficiency and rationalize energy and resource-
intensive sectors as well as to control soaring exports and deflate the ballooning trade 
surplus. In October 2007, China’s Ministry of Commerce and the SEPA (2007) were in 
an unusual collaboration to jointly issue the antipollution circular. Targeted at its 
booming export industry, this new regulation would suspend the rights of those 
enterprises that don’t meet their environmental obligations to engage foreign trade in the 
period of more than one year and less than three years. A significant portion of China’s 
air pollution can be traced directly to the production of goods that are exported. In the 
Pearl River delta, a major manufacturing region in Southern China, as indicated in Figure 
7, Streets et al. (2006) found that 37% of the total SO2 emissions in the region, 28% of 
NOx, 24% of PM, and 8% of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are caused by export-
related activities. In the city of Shenzhen alone, the regional leader in industrial 
development and trade, 75% of VOCs, 71% of PM, 91% of NOx, and 89% of SO2 
emissions from the industrial sector were released in manufacturing of exported goods. 
Effectively implemented, this new policy will help polluting enterprises that export their 
products to pay attention to the environmental effects of their products and produce more 
environmentally friendly products. 
 
 
Figure 7  Percentage of Air Pollutants Tied to Export Manufacturing in the Pearl 
River Delta and Shenzhen, China 
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Source: Streets et al. (2006) 
75%
71%
91%
89%
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Shenzhen Pearl River delta
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Nitrous oxide emissions
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Volatile organic compounds
 
Tougher Emissions Standards 
Setting and enforcing emissions standards for mobile and stationary sources and for fuel 
quality are essential to control emissions and improve air quality, and at the same time 
provide an impetus for improvements in technology. Developing Asian countries that are 
facing acute air pollution problems have begun to adopt tougher European standards for 
both vehicles and fuel specifications. China has taken significant steps to control vehicle 
emissions. Following the phasing out of leaded gasoline nationwide in July 2000, China’s 
SEPA requires all new light duty vehicles sold after April 2001 to meet State Phase I 
(similar to Euro I) vehicle emission standards and after July 1, 2004 to meet State Phase 
II (similar to Euro II) standards across China. Beginning July 1, 2007, China started 
implementing State Phase III (similar to Euro III) vehicle emission standards, with State 
Phase IV (similar to Euro IV) vehicle emission standards scheduled to be introduced on 
July 1, 2010 (see Table 8).7 Pollution from State Phase III standards is 30% lower than 
that from State Phase II standards. Pollution from State Phase IV standards even goes 
down below 60% of that from State Phase II standards (Xinhuanet, 2007b). Clearly, more 
                                                 
7 European emission standards, e.g., Euros I-V, are sets of requirements defining the 
acceptable limits for exhaust emissions of new vehicles sold in EU member states. The 
emission standards are defined in a series of European Union directives staging the 
progressive introduction of increasingly stringent standards. Currently, emissions of NOx, 
HC, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter are regulated for most vehicle type 
(Wikipedia, 2007). 
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stringent vehicle emission requirements by these new standards will help to reduce 
substantially the environmental stress in China. 
 
 
Table 8   Vehicle Emission Standards and the Time to Enter into Force in China, 
ASEAN and European Union 
 
 Euro I Euro II Euro III Euro IV Euro V 
European 
Union 
 
 
China 
  Beijing 
 
India 
ASEAN 
 
 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
  Philippines 
  Singapore 
 
Thailand 
Vietnam 
 
July 1992 
 
 
April 2001 
1999 
 
2000 
 
January 
1996 
 
July 1, 2004 
August 2002 
 
2005 
December 
2005 
(targeted) 
Early 2006 
Mid 2006 
Dec 2006 
2005 
 
 
July 2007 
 
January 
2000 
 
July 1, 2007 
December 
30, 2005 
2010 
 
 
 
1st Q 2007 
 
 
 
 
Early 2005 
 
January 
2005 
 
July 1, 2010 
1st half of  
2008 
 
December 
2010 
(targeted) 
2012 
2010 
2010 
Oct 2006 
(Diesel) 
2010 
2012 
 
September 
2009 
(proposed) 
 
 
Sources: Auto Fuel Committee of India (cited in Menon-Choudhary and Shukla, 2004); 
JAMA (2006); Wikipedia (2007); Xinhuanet (2005 and 2007a).  
 
 
New vehicles that don’t comply with the new standards cannot be sold in China. Clearly, 
vehicle emission standards in China have been become increasingly stringent over time, 
and while China still lags behind the European Union regarding the schedule of the 
emissions requirements for new vehicles, its gap with the EU requirements is gradually 
reduced from about nine yeas in 2001 to five and a half years in 2010. With the 
population of registered vehicles reaching to 148 million by the end of March 2007 in 
China (Xinhuanet, 2007b) and continuing its explosive growth, and the emissions from 
vehicles as the main source of air pollution in many Chinese cities, these cities have been 
proactive in controlling vehicle emissions. With the largest population of registered 
vehicles in China (Xinhuanet, 2005),8 Beijing took the lead. China’s capital started a 
                                                 
8 It took 48 years for the population of registered vehicles in Beijing reached to one 
million in February 1997 from 2300 in the early 1950s. It took six and a half years to 
reach two millions in August 2003. But it took only 3 years and nine moths to reach three 
millions on May 27, 2007, much quicker than what experts expected (Xinhuanet, 2007c). 
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pilot program to stop sales of leaded gasoline by July 1997, three years ahead of
nationwide ban, and enforces State Phase II standards two years ahead of the national 
schedule and State Phase III standards one and a half years ahead of the national schedule. 
By enforcing State Phase III standards ahead of the national schedule and speeding up the 
eliminating of existing vehicles with lower standards, total pollution from vehicles in 
Beijing is estimated to be cut by 20% by 2008, compared with current level of pollution 
(Xinhuanet, 2005). As commitments to the Green Olympic Games, Beijing introduced 
State Phase IV fuel standards on January 1, 2008 and is scheduled to introduce State 
Phase IV vehicle emission standards in the first half of 2008, prior to the Beijing Olympic 
Games on August 8, 2008 (Xinhuanet, 2007a). 
 the 
 
In terms of vehicle emission regulations, India and most ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) countries are at about the same levels as China, but, as 
indicated in Table 8, their time schedules to implement these regulations somewhat lag 
behind China. Based on the Auto Fuel Committee appointed by the Government of India 
in 2000 (cited in Menon-Choudhary and Shukla, 2004), India implemented Euro I and 
Euro II vehicle emission standards for the entire country in 2000 and 2005, respectively. 
Euro III standards are set to be implemented nationwide in 2010. Most ASEAN countries 
are examining the harmonization of fuel quality and vehicle emissions standards. The 
time schedule to ban leaded gasoline and introduce Euro II emission standards with the 
corresponding fuel properties was targeted at the end of 2005, while Euro IV standards 
are currently envisioned to be implemented by all ASEAN countries by 2010 except for 
Indonesia and Vietnam that set 2012 as their implementation date (JAMA, 2006). As 
indicated in Table 8, except for Singapore and Thailand, all other ASEAN countries 
didn’t meet their 2005 target set for the introduction of Euro II vehicle emission standards. 
This delay raises the question of whether the ASEAN will be able to introduce Euro IV 
standards under the timeframe as specified above. 
 
The introduction of stringent vehicle emission standards has led to significant benefits. 
The Auto Fuel Committee of India estimates significant reductions in annual health costs 
with the implementation of Euro II in 2001, Euro III in 2005 and Euro IV vehicle 
emission standards targeted in 2010 in Delhi. As shown in Table 9, annual health costs 
reduce as emission norms become more stringent. The costs can be reduced further if all 
vehicles meet the new standards, which are applicable only for new vehicles and do not 
apply to vehicles already on the roads. To motivate auto manufacturers to produce more 
environmentally friendly vehicles, the State Administration of Taxation and the Ministry 
of Finance in China have cut consumption tax bill by 30% for those manufacturers whose 
products have met State Phases II, III and IV emission standards ahead of the national 
schedules.  
 
 
Table 9  Annual Health Costs with Pre Euro and Euro Vehicle Emission Standards 
in Delhi (in Crores at 2000-01 Prices) 
 
 Pre Euro Euro II Euro III Euro IV 
Annual health costs 228 30 22 15 
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Source: Auto Fuel Committee of India (cited in Menon-Choudhary and Shukla, 2004). 
 
Tightening of vehicle emission standards has led to improvements in vehicle technologies 
and exhaust systems. This is helpful, but not enough to ensure that the new vehicles 
actually comply with emission standards as the quality of fuels is inextricably linked to 
the vehicle emissions. This at least requires a parallel improvement in fuel quality. In fact, 
most countries would ensure the availability of fuel prior to the introduction of its 
corresponding emission regulation. It is reported that the national schedule of 
implementing State Phase III vehicle emission standards in China will be delayed to 
December 30, 2009, mainly because the Chinese big oil corporations are only able to 
provide nationwide fuel whose quality is line with State Phase III emission standards by 
then (Xinhuanet, 2007b). With about 24000 vehicles every day added to already 
congested roads in China, delaying in the implementation of State Phase III standards 
will further place the environmental stress on air quality. Clearly, there is increasing 
emergency to bring fuel quality standards into line with vehicle emission standards.   
 
Along with setting and enforcing progressively stringent emissions standards for vehicles, 
many cities in Asian countries have shifted vehicle fleets to cleaner fuels to significantly 
reduce pollution from vehicles. In 1999, China introduced the National Clean Vehicle 
Action Plan to promote the use of alternative fuels, in particular CNG (compressed 
natural gas) and LPG (liquefied petroleum gas), for urban bus and taxi industries firstly. 
This Plan was piloted in the twelve Chinese demonstration cities. Now, CNG and LPG 
vehicles account for a large portion of urban buses and taxis in China. For example, by 
the end of 2006, 27 gas stations to fill LPG had been established in Guangzhou, and 
6,400 buses and 16,000 taxis had made use of LPG, accounting for 80% and 100% of 
their corresponding total numbers in this Chinese mega-city (Wang, 2007). Prior to the 
2008 Olympic Games, Beijing plans that 90% of public transport and 100% of taxies will 
have use of CNG as a fuel (Sinanet, 2007b). Delhi faced severe air pollution, about 70% 
from vehicle emissions. To control vehicle emissions, the Supreme Court directive in 
1998 called for the introduction of CNG as a fuel for all public transport in Delhi. This 
led to the implementation of CNG program. Now Delhi boasts of the world’s largest fleet 
of over 15,000 CNG buses, with substantial benefits for air quality (Hatwal, 2004). 
 
For concerns about soaring energy demand and the corresponding pollution, there has 
been growing interest in biofuels, such as ethanol and biodiesel, as alternative fuels for 
transport. As indicated in Table 10, China and India are the world’s third and fourth 
largest producers of ethanol, but their production were fairly stable over the past three 
years and are far behind the two dominant producers - Brazil and the US. The former had 
long been the world’s leading ethanol producer until the latter caught up to the former for 
the first time in 2005 (Renewable Fuels Association, 2007), and its ethanol provided 41% 
of all non-diesel motor vehicle fuel consumed in Brazil in 2005 (REN21, 2006). They 
together produce about 70% of the world’s total. China is embarking on a push into 
biofuels. As indicated in Table 11, ethanol production is currently about 3% of China’s 
transport fuel use. This share of ethanol is the highest among the 21 APEC economies. 
China plans to increase its ethanol production to 5% of the country’s transport fuel use by 
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2010 (Rank, 2006) and further to 10 million tons a year by 2020 (Zhang, 2007b). Other 
biofuels goals set in developing Asian countries include the Philippines’ proposed 25% 
E10 blending fuel by 2010 and Thailand’s 3% biodiesel target (REN21, 2007). 
 
 
Table 10  Annual World Ethanol Production by Country (Million Gallons, All 
Ethanol Grades) 
 
Country 2004 2005 2006
Brazil  3,989 4,227 4,491
United States 3,535 4.264 4,855
China  964 1,004 1,017
India  462 449 502
France  219 240 251
Russia  198 198 171
South Africa  110 103 102
United Kingdom  106 92 74
Saudi Arabia  79 32 52
Spain  79 93 122
Thailand  74 79 93
Germany  71 114 202
Ukraine  66 65 71
Canada  61 61 153
Poland  53 58 66
Indonesia  44 45 45
Argentina  42 44 45
Italy  40 40 43
Australia  33 33 39
Japan  31 30 30
Pakistan  26 24 24
Sweden  26 29 30
Philippines  22 22 22
South Korea  22 17 16
Guatemala  17 17 21
Cuba  16 12 12
Ecuador  12 14 12
Mexico  9 12 13
Nicaragua  8 7 8
Mauritius  6 3 2
Zimbabwe  6 5 7
Kenya  3 4 5
Swaziland  3 3 5
Others  338 710 270
Total  10,770 12,150  13,489
 
Source: Renewable Fuels Association (2007). 
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Table 11  Transport Fuel Use and Ethanol Production in APEC in 2004 (Kilo ton of 
oil equivalent) 
 
Economy Transport Ethanol Economy Transport Ethanol 
Australia 27,781 69 New Zealand 5411 --
Brunei 371 -- PNG 374 --
Canada 50,154 128 Peru 3088 --
Chile 6641 -- Philippines 8673 46
China 67,531 2,022 Russia 41,063 --
Hong Kong 5626 -- Singapore 4224 --
Indonesia 20,952 92 Chinese Taipei 12,808 --
Japan 84,488 65 Thailand 21,107 155
Korea 32,572 46 United States 616,908 7,413
Malaysia 14,226 -- Vietnam 5561 --
Mexico 61,867 19 TOTAL 1,091,426 10,055
 
Note: Ethanol in million gallons in Table 10 converted from million gallon into kilo ton 
of oil equivalent (ktoe) using the conversion factor of 2.097 ktoe/million gallon (= 10**6 
gallon * 84000 Btu/gallon *1 ktoe/40.097 10**9 Btu). 
Sources: Renewable Fuels Association (2007) for ethanol production and Bloyd (2007) 
for transport fuels. 
 
Growing Asian cities are implementing demand-side traffic management measures to 
reduce congestion and urban air pollution. These cities are prioritizing public transport 
and are promoting efficient public transport systems, such as dedicated-lane bus rapid 
transit (BRT) systems. BRT systems have been highly successful in such cities as 
Curitiba, Brazil and Bogota, Colombia, and are able to move people with subway-like 
efficiency at only about 5% of the cost of subway systems (He, 2003). Bangkok and 
Jakarta have a BRT network to complement their existing public transport systems and 
reduce traffic congestion (Schwela et al., 2006). Since 1989, Taipei has been operating a 
BRT system that has been expanded to have dedicated bus lanes on 10 streets connecting 
4 MRT lanes and having total length of 57 km (Chang, 2003). The first BRT in China 
were put into full operation in Beijing on December 30, 2005. It has total length of 16 km 
with 17 bus stops (BRT China, 2006). The second BRT in China were put into operation 
in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province on April 26, 2006. It has total length of 28 km with 33 
bus stops, and has a daily ridership of 45300. During the first year of operation, its total 
ridership amounts to 16.06 million passengers (Hangzhou Public Transport Daily, 2007). 
Clearly, these constructed BRT systems are beginning to make a useful contribution to 
improving public transportation and urban air quality in the cities of their operation. But 
to make dramatic improvements, much more BRT systems need to be constructed in 
Asian cities. While such prospect of dramatic increases remains to be seen, there are 
encouraging signs that other Asian cities have begun very seriously to examine the 
potential of BRT systems in improving public transportation and urban air quality.  
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Increasing Energy Efficiency and the Use of Clean Energy 
As the standards of living improve, just like other parts of the world, there is increasing 
demand for electronic appliances, comfortable living space and the associated heating 
and cooling services, and vehicles in Asia as well. This will put great pressure on energy 
demand and at the same time, provides an opportunity to increase energy efficiency 
through improved demand side management. To encourage investments in energy 
efficiency improvements and accelerate energy efficiency gains on the demand side, 
many Asian countries have designed and promulgated efficiency standards for appliances 
and industrial equipments, building codes and new vehicle fuel economy standards, 
coupled with appropriate energy-pricing policies (World Bank, 2006; IEA, 2006a). This 
way of improving energy efficiency is the cheapest, fastest and most effective way to 
address environmental concerns in the short term. In the meantime, improved energy 
efficiency increases overall air quality, reduces greenhouse gas emissions and improves 
energy security. Given that many developing Asian countries suffer frequently from 
energy shortages, increasing energy efficiency reduces the need to invest in energy-
supply infrastructures but brings energy needs and supplies into balance. Moreover, 
because many Asian economies are exports-oriented, reducing energy use through greater 
efficiency will reduce energy costs and thus enhance their international competitiveness. 
There are encouraging signs that Asian countries are taking unprecedented efforts to 
improve energy efficiency.   
 
While China has been calling for energy saving since the early 1980s, this country has set 
for the first time the goal of cutting energy use per unit of GDP by 20% in its current 
five-year economic plan. While China achieved a quadrupling of its GDP with only a 
doubling of energy consumption between 1980 and 2000, as indicated in Figure 3, China 
has experienced since 2001 faster energy consumption than economic growth (Zhang, 
2005). Clearly, this is very challenging goal in light of the recent increase in energy 
intensity in China. Meeting this goal could cut China’s energy use in 2010 by 10% below 
the baseline policy scenario (Lin et al., 2006). Because more low or zero-carbon energy is 
used by then, CO2 emissions in China will be cut by at least 10% relative to its baseline 
policy scenario.9 Given that industry consumes about 70% of the country’s total energy 
consumption (Zhang, 2003), this sector is crucial for China to meet its own set goal. This 
has led China to establish the “Top 1000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Action 
Program”. This program covers 1008 enterprises in nine key energy-supply and 
consuming industrial subsectors. Each of them on the list consumed at least 0.18 million 
tons of coal equivalent (tce) in 2004, and all together consumed 33% of the national total 
and 47% of industrial energy consumption in 2004. The program aims to save 100 
million tce cumulatively during the period 2006-10, thus making a significant 
contribution to China’s overall goal of 20% energy intensity-improvement (NDRC, 
2006a). For residential buildings, China has taken the three steps to improve energy 
efficiency. The first step requires a 30% cut in energy use relative to typical Chinese 
residential buildings designed in 1980-1981. Next, China requires that new buildings 
                                                 
9 The Chinese government projects that meeting this energy intensity goal will cut 
China’s CO2 emissions by 10% below its baseline level in 2010 (Brahic, 2007). 
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have to be 50% more efficient by 2010. Then, the third step is to increase the energy-
saving goal to 65% for new buildings by 2020 (Lang, 2004; Zhang, 2005). Tianjin is the 
first metropolitan city in China to embark on reform for heat supply and charge. As 
indicated in Table 12, by the end of 2006, 73.49 million m2 energy efficient residential 
buildings were built in this city, accounting for 47.8% of the total residential buildings 
(Zheng and You, 2007). In Beijing, the building sector consumed 28% of its total energy 
use in 2004. By the end of 2004, 175.2 million m2 energy efficient residential buildings 
were built in China’s capital, 37.1% of which met with the 30% more energy efficient 
standards and the remaining 62.9% met with the 50% more energy efficient standards 
(see Table 12). All these energy efficient buildings in Beijing accounted for 65.1% of its 
total residential buildings. Beijing plans that all new residential buildings have to meet 
with the 65% more energy efficient standards by 2010, one decade ahead of the national 
schedule (BMCDR, 2006). In the transport sector, China has set even more stringent fuel 
economy standards for its rapidly growing passenger vehicle fleet than those in Australia, 
Canada, California and the United States, although they are less stringent than those in 
Japan and the European Union (see Figure 8). Implemented in the two phases, the 
standards classify vehicles into 16 weight classes, covering passenger cars, SUVs and 
multi-purpose vans. Converted to the U.S. CAFF (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) test 
cycle, the average fuel economy standards of new vehicles in China are projected to 
reach 36.7 miles per gallon in 2008 (An and Sauer, 2004). 
 
 
Table 12  Residential Buildings by Energy Efficient Standards in Beijing and 
Tianjin, China 
  
Region Non-Energy-
Efficient 
Buildings 
Energy Efficient 
Buildings in the 
First Step 
Energy Efficient 
Buildings in the 
Second Step 
Energy Efficient 
Buildings in the 
Third Step 
Beijing by 
2004 
Tianjin by 
2006 
 
35% 
 
52% 
 
24% 
 
23% 
 
41% 
 
15% 
 
0% 
 
10% 
 
Sources: BMCDR (2006); Zheng and You (2007). 
 
 
Figure 8  Comparison of Fuel Economy Standards for Vehicles 
Notes: Dotted lines denote proposed standards; MPG – Miles per gallon. 
Source: An and Sauer (2004). 
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Even Japan, one of the world’s most efficient energy-consuming countries, which 
improved its overall energy efficiency by 37% over the period 1973-2003, sets the goal 
of further improving its energy efficiency by at least 30% by 2030, relative to its 2003 
level (METI, 2006). As a policy measure, the country will speed up the introduction of 
the Top Runner Program, which was introduced in 1998. Such a Program identifies the 
most energy efficient residential/office appliances and light-duty vehicles in each 
category and requires future models to meet a level of energy consumption close to the 
current (or expected future) best. This Program improves average energy efficiency by 
encouraging both improvements in the worst appliances/vehicles in terms of energy 
efficiency and continuous improvements in the best (The Government of Japan, 2002; 
IEA, 2006a). 
 
However, from a long-term perspective, widespread use of clean energy is a real solution. 
As indicated in Figure 9, the share of renewable energies (including traditional biomass) 
in the total primary energy supply in developing Asian countries in 2004 was very high 
(24%), compared with the OECD (6%) and the world average (14%). However, as 
indicated in Table 13, the share of hydropower and modern (or new) renewable energies 
(namely, solar, wind, geothermal, wave and tidal energy) in total renewables is very low 
in developing Asian countries (9.4% in 2004), in comparison with the OECD (43.8%), 
although this share of modern renewable energies in the energy mix is growing. Over the 
past two decades, there have been clear downward trends of renewable energy costs, and 
these energy sources are becoming less and less costly (UNDP, 2004). However, they are 
still more costly than conventional sources, in some cases, even several times more costly 
than that from conventional sources. This limits the penetration of modern renewable 
energies. 
 
 
Figure 9  Share of Renewables in Total Primary Energy Supply in 2004 (%) 
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Source: Drawn based on date from IEA (2006a). 
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Table 13  Shares of Hydropower and Modern Renewables in Total Renewables in 
2004 (%) 
 
Country/Region Hydropower Modern Renewables 
OECD 
     US 
      European Union 25 
      Japan 
Developing Asia 
     China 
      India 
World 
32.7 
21.9 
22.8 
44.4 
7.1 
12.0 
3.2 
16.4 
11.1 
10.5 
9.6 
22.2 
2.3 
0 
0 
3.9 
 
Source: IEA (2006a). 
 
 
Increasing this share not only enhances energy security, but also is environmentally 
friendly and conducive to good health. This has created a new impetus for encouraging 
the use of renewables. As indicated in Table 14, at least 47 economies including all 25 
European Union countries have established some kind of policy targets for renewables. 
These targets are revised and strengthened over time. Developing Asian countries, such 
as China, India, Malaysia, Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand are among the countries 
with national targets. For example, Pakistan plans to achieve a 10% share of total 
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electricity generation through renewable energies by 2015 (REN21, 2007). China plans to 
look to alternative energy sources to meet up to 16% of the nation’s energy needs by 
2020.10 At present, alternative energy sources account for only about 8% of China’s 
energy supply. Under this ambitious government plan, China aims to have an installed 
capacity of 300 gigawatts (one gigawatt equals one million kilowatts, GW) for 
hydropower (including large hydropower), 30 GW for wind power and 30 GW for 
biopower (power generated from biomass), and produce 10 million tons of ethanol and 2 
million tons of biodiesel by 2020 (Zhang, 2007b). Philippines aims to double installation 
of generating capacity from renewable energy sources to approximately 4.7GW to enable 
the country to be the largest geothermal energy producer in the world, the leading wind 
energy producer in Southeast Asia and to double its hydro capacity by 2013 (REN21, 
2007). 
 
 
Table 14  47 Economies with Renewable Energy Targets 
 
Country/Region Target(s) 
Australia An additional 9.5 TWh of electricity annually by 2010 and 
thereafter adding the same amount annually until 2020 
Brazil 3.3 GW added by 2006 from wind, biomass, small hydro 
Canada 3.5% to 15% of electricity in 4 provinces; other types of targets in 6 
provinces 
China 10% by 2010 and 16% by 2020 of primary energy, with 300 GW 
for hydro, 30 GW for wind power, 30 GW for biopower and 1.8 
GW for solar PV, 300 million m2 for solar hot water, and 10 million 
tons of ethanol and 2 million tons of biodiesel produced by 2020 
Chinese Taipei 3-5% of  total energy and 10% of installed power capacity by 2010 
Dominican Rep. 500 MW wind power capacity by 2015 
Egypt 3% of electricity by 2010 
European Union 
25 
12% of primary energy by 2010 and 20% by 2020; 21% of 
electricity by 2010; Biofuels: 5.75% of transport fuels by 2010, 8% 
by 2015 and 10% by 2020 
India 10% of added electric power capacity during 2003-2012 
(expected/planned) 
Israel 2% of electricity by 2007; 5% of electricity by 2016 
Japan 12.2 TWh, or 1.35% of electricity by 2010, excluding geothermal 
                                                 
10 Let’s look at the European Union, which is widely considered to be the world leader in 
renewable energy, to put China’s renewable energy goals into perspective. The European 
Union aims at renewable energies meeting 12% of its primary energy by 2010 and 20% 
by 2020 from its current level of 6.5% (European Commission, 2007a and 2007b). At 
first glance, the EU’s goal of tripling the share of renewable energy from the current level 
to 20% by 2020 seems even more ambitious than China’s renewable energy goal. But 
because energy demand in China grows at least three times faster than EU does, doubling 
renewable energy in China’s total energy mix by 2020 requires that renewable energy in 
China grows at a rate of four times that the rate of the EU. 
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and large hydro (RPS) 
Korea 7% of electricity by 2010, including large hydro, and 1.3 GW of 
grid-connected solar PV by 2011, including 100,000 homes (0.3 
GW) 
Malaysia 5% of electricity by 2005; 5% blending for biodiesel by 2008 
Mali 15% of energy by 2020 
New Zealand 30 PJ of added capacity (including heat and transport fuels) by 2012
Norway 7 TWh from heat and wind by 2010 
Philippines Double total renewable energy generating capacity to 4.7 GW and 
its hydro power capacity by 2013; 25% E10 blending fuel by 2010 
Pakistan 10% of power generation by 2015 
Singapore 50,000 m2 (~35 MWth) of solar thermal systems by 2012 
South Africa  10 TWh added final energy by 2013 
Switzerland 3.5 TWh from electricity and heat by 2010 
Thailand 8% of total primary energy by 2011 (excluding traditional rural 
biomass); 3% biodiesel target by 2011 
United States 5% to 30% of electricity in 18 states (including DC) by 2010-12 
 
Sources: REN21 (2005, 2006 and 2007); Zhang (2007b); European Commission (2007a 
and 2007b); Council of the European Union (2007); MOEA Taiwan (2005). 
 
 
To that end, governments need to put in place policies and incentives favorable to the 
development of renewables. Currently, subsidies for fossil fuels are quite common in 
developing Asian countries, and the prices of fossil fuels seldom account for the full 
environmental and social costs of their production, distribution and use. These factors 
have been significant barriers to the penetration and commercialization of all renewable 
energies except large hydropower. Thus, governments need to abolish those subsidies and 
to internalize external costs to level the playing field. This is a helpful step in increasing 
the cost competitiveness of renewables, but not enough. Governments still need to 
provide additional support policies to promote widespread use of renewable energies. As 
indicated in Table 15, at least 48 economies including 14 developing countries have some 
types of renewable energy promotion policies. Such policies include public research, 
development and demonstration (RD&D) programs, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy 
mandates, tax credits for investment/production, preferential loans, accelerated 
depreciation rates, technology-forcing regulations, reduction on import duty and export 
facilitation, consumer purchasing incentives and government green purchasing 
preferences, green certificate trading, and competitive bidding. As indicated in Figure 10, 
feed-in tariff, which obliges the utilities to purchase electricity from renewable energy 
sources at a fixed rate, is the most common promotion policy. Since the US enacted a 
national feed-in law in 1978, at least 32 countries and 9 states/provinces had adopted 
such policies by early 2006, more than half of which have been enacted since 2002 
(REN21, 2005 and 2006). Feed-in tariffs, enacted in 1990, amended in 1998 and replaced 
with a new law in 2000, have been instrumental in making Germany the world leader. 
Staring from virtually no renewable energy industry in 1990, installed capacity of wind 
power in Germany increased more than 200-fold between 1991 and 2002, and PV 
 34
capacity increased over 60-fold in a similar time frame (UNDP, 2004). India is the first 
developing country that established feed-in tariffs in 1993, followed by Sri Lanka, 
Thailand (for small power producers only), Brazil, Indonesia, Nicaragua, and China. 
Driven by a 2003 national law requiring new state-level polices, the six Indian states have 
adopted new feed-in tariffs. The state of Maharashtra also updated its 2003 wind power 
feed-in tariffs to apply to biomass, biogass and small power generation (REN21, 2005 
and 2006). Feed-in tariffs enacted in 2005 took effect on January 1, 2006 in China. 
Contrary to the wide expectations, the standard feed-in tariff model did not apply to wind 
power, only to biomass power.11 Biopower tariffs are set at province-specific average 
desulfurized coal power tariff plus a subsidy of RMB 0.25 per kWh. From 2010 onwards, 
the subsidy will decrease by 2% each year and will be cancelled completely after 15 
years (NDRC, 2006b).  
 
Figure 10  Cumulative Number of Countries/States/Provinces Enacting Feed-in 
Tariffs 
Source: Drawn based on information from REN21 (2007). 
 
                                                 
11 Wind power industry and policy analysts in China recommended the Chinese 
government to adopt a feed-in tariff. That will oblige the utilities to purchase electricity 
from renewable energy sources at a fixed rate. But to the surprise of many who expected 
a “coal-fired power indexed tariff plus subsidy” as the tariff model for wind power, the 
Chinese government decided on a competitive bidding mechanism to determine the 
proposed wind power grid tariff. Simply put, bidding to determine the price at which a 
unit of electricity will be provided to the grid. The reason for not choosing the expected 
model is the Chinese government’s belief that under the feed-in tariff model, the wind 
power tariff in the southeast coastal areas would be almost double those in the western 
regions of the country because of the higher coal prices in the former, despite the fact that 
much of the wind resources are located in the western provinces. That would make it 
unlikely that investors would be interested in the western regions where their return 
would be much smaller, an outcome that is not beneficial to the country’s overall 
sustainable development objectives.  
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Table 15  Renewable Energy Promotion Policies 
Country Feed- 
in 
tariff 
Renewable 
portfolio 
standard 
Capital 
subsidies,
grants, or
Rebates 
Investment
excise, or 
other tax 
credits 
Sales 
tax, 
energy 
tax, VAT
reduction
Tradable 
renewable 
energy 
certificates 
Energy 
production
payments/
tax credits 
Net 
Metering
Public 
investment,
loans, or 
financing 
Public 
competitive
bidding 
Developed and transition countries (34) 
Australia  X X   X   X  
Canada (*) (*) X X X   (*) X (*) 
Czech 
Republic 
X  X X X X  X   
Denmark X   X  X  X   
France X  X X X X   X X 
Germany X  X X X    X  
Japan (*) X X   X  X X  
Netherlands X  X X  X X    
New 
Zealand 
  X      X  
South 
Korea 
X  X  X      
Spain X  X X     X  
United 
Kingdom 
 X X  X X     
United 
States 
(*) (*) X X (*) (*) X (*) (*) (*) 
………….and 21 other developed and transition countries 
Developing countries (14) 
Argentina   X    X    
Brazil X        X  
Cambodia   X        
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China X  X X X    X X 
Costa Rica X          
Guatemala    X X      
India (*) (*) X X X    X X 
Indonesia X          
Mexico    X    X   
Nicaragua X   X       
Philippines    X X    X  
Sri Lanka X          
Thailand X X X     X   
Turkey X  X        
 
Notes: 1) Entries with X mean the specified policies enacted; 2) Entries with an asterisk (*) mean that some states/provinces within 
these countries have state/provincial leve; policies but there is no national level policy. 
Source: Adapted from RNE21 (2005). 
Renewable energy promotion policy is an essential ingredient in promoting the 
widespread use of renewable energies. But, the specific form and level of this support 
will clearly differ in design from technology to technology and from country to country, 
depending on the overall policy framework in place and the maturity and cost of each 
technology in each country. For example, Japan enacted renewable portfolio standard 
(RPS) law in 2003 to aim to the electricity generation of 12.2 TWh from renewable 
energy sources, or 1.35% of the national electricity supply by 2010. The Japanese 
government will follow up implementation of RPS for a period of three years after its 
introduction and, if necessary, will review the scheme for RPS. Every four years, the 
government will set annual indicators for the generation of electricity from new energy 
resources by electric retailers based on an eight-year time frame (REN21, 2007). For 
biomass energy, the Chinese government is deliberating a risk-sharing mechanism to 
encourage its development. Such a mechanism allows biomass energy companies to 
reserve risk funds before paying taxes during the period of oil price hikes. Those funds 
will be used to compensate losses and sustain their operations when oil prices plummet 
(Zhang, 2007b). For wind power, feed-in tariffs are only applied to small power 
producers in Thailand. Pakistan initiates limited feed-in tariffs and waives import duties 
for wind turbines to boost wind power development. In China, the central government 
has cut by half the value added tax on wind power from the normal rate of 17% to 8.5%, 
has lowered the rate of duty on domestic investment in wind power to 6% in comparison 
with the normal rate of 23%, and has exempted duty on equipments imported for 
renewable energy technologies in joint venture. Some local governments provide even 
more favorable policies. For example, Inner Mongolia has levied the value added tax of 
6% on wind power (Zhang, 2007b). These wind power policies as helpful, but not enough 
to ensure that China will meet its ambitious target, which requires adding almost 2 GW 
per year from the current level of 1.2 GW. To meet the goal of wind power, China is 
taking a different policy approach and is implementing it aggressively. Since 2003, China 
has adopted the so-called Wind Power Concession Program as its primary strategy to 
further promote wind power development. This government-run program auctions off 
development rights for wind power projects of 100 MW or above for 25 years, which 
include a guaranteed tariff for the first 30,000 hours, as well as concession operation 
agreements. Such on-grid tariff of wind power is decided through a competitive bidding 
process. If such a tariff is higher than the reference on-grid tariff of desulfurized coal-
fired power, then the difference will be shared in the selling price at the provincial and 
national grid levels. For the remainder of the period (namely, after the first 30,000 hours 
until the ending of the total concession period of 25 years), the tariff of wind power is set 
to be equal to the average local on-grid tariff.  
 
China completed in 2006 the fourth round of bidding for three wind power concessions 
projects of total capacity of 700 MW. The Chinese government takes the lessons learned 
in the bidding processes and is making efforts to ensure that this program works 
effectively to promote a robust and sizeable wind power industry in China. No doubt, the 
bidding-based program has introduced competition to both the construction and 
management of wind farms. However, it is not without its own problems. One is that 
investors underbid to win a project. For example, the winner in the first round of bidding 
offered the unprecedented grid tariff of 390 Yuan per 1,000 KWh, whereas the other 
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offers were in the range of 600 to 700 Yuan. Another problem is that the grid tariff is not 
known until after the bidding, which makes it difficult for firms to secure bank loans as 
the banks cannot assess the rate of return on the project without knowing the tariff 
(Zhang, 2005). The Chinese government takes the lessons learned in the bidding 
processes and is making efforts to ensure that this program works effectively to promote 
a robust and sizeable wind power industry. To prevent irrational bidding that could 
endanger overall project quality and investor return, the Chinese government has lowered 
the weight of the grid tariff in the bidding assessment process and assigned more weight 
to other factors, such as local content, investment and financial ability, financial plan and 
technical plan. In the first round of bidding in 2003, the tariff was the only criteria 
determining the winner. Those who offered the lowest grid tariff won. But, the weight of 
grid tariff in the overall bidding decision has been declining. It accounted for only 40% 
by the third round in 2005, and only 25% in the current fifth round of bidding. With these 
modifications, the bidding tariff is now ranked as the second key criteria under a 100-
point bidding evaluation system, after the 70% local content requirement that accounts 
for 35% in the current round of bidding.12 However, simply lowering the weight of the 
grid tariff in the bidding process is not the answer because that will simply increase the 
transaction costs (Zhang, 2005). To lower transaction costs and at the same time ensure 
project quality, competitive bidding needs to be coupled with a mechanism that would 
hold bidders accountable for the implementation of project, robust technical standards for 
design and construction to avoid downward pricing pressure leading to substandard 
technology and implementation,13 and/or a floor price to prevent unrealistic low bids 
from jeopardizing the bidding process (Zhang, 2005; Baker & McKenzie et al., 2007). 
  
 
The Integration of Environmental Policies with Economic and Sectoral Policies  
Developing Asian countries are confronted with many other pressing social concerns, 
such as providing water and sanitation services to the urban poor, improving public 
transportation and other basic infrastructures, and reducing poverty as well as improving 
the environment. In this context, in order to address environmental issues effectively and 
achieve the maximal gains, environmental policies need to be integrated with economic 
policies, investment policies, energy policies, transportation policies, land-use policies 
and other urban development policies. This will help countries view environmental 
policies as not just for tackling potential environmental threats per se, but as an integrated 
                                                 
12 This 70% local content requirement means that wind power projects must have over 
70% of their turbine components locally made, and that the wind turbine generator must 
be assembled in China. The aim is to encourage technology and manufacturing industry 
for wind turbines in China. This requirement was originally proposed in relation to wind 
concession farms in China, but was extended to include ordinary wind farm projects as 
well in 2005. 
13 This is the lesson learned in India’s competitive bidding regime. It was a lack of 
turbine standards or production requirements that led several early projects to poorly 
perform, despite significant technology advances. As a response, in 2003, certification of 
design and performance became mandatory in its bidding regime (Baker & McKenzie et 
al., 2007). 
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framework to tackle these aforementioned concerns, as well as a means of improving 
energy efficiency, reducing congestions, saving money, and setting pro-active policies to 
ensure sustainable development.  
 
As far as minimizing environmental effect is concerned, it is even better to integrate 
environmental issues with economic and sectoral policies at the planning stage, rather 
than at the implementation stage. Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) is a useful 
tool to bridge the policy divide that separates those government institutions responsible 
for economic planning from those line industries in charge for environmental protection 
at the planning stage of any development activity (UNESCAP, 2006). SEA integrates 
environmental issues into the formulation of plans and programs, thus reducing their 
overall environmental impacts to a minimum. China and Korea have shown great interest 
in applying the SEA. Indeed, several provinces in China, including Inner Mongolia, have 
used the SEA in mapping out their 11th five-year plan running from 2006 to 2010.  
  
 
Active Engagement of the Private Sector 
While governments determine the rules under which businesses act, set environmental 
goals and commit to international environmental agreements, they count on firms’ full 
cooperation. After all, the firms themselves are entities that use natural resources, make 
products and emit pollution. Thus, a sustainable future for Asia is not possible without 
the active engagement of the private sector (ADB, 2005b). 
 
In the mean time, the private sector is facing growing market and public pressures for 
better environmental performance. As many Asian countries are based on export-oriented 
economies, globalization and the elimination of trade barriers between and inside 
countries are placing unprecedented pressures on even their domestic industries to 
maintain, if not lose,  their competitive position through greater efficiency and 
responsible environmental management. As trade liberalization progresses, companies 
are facing ever-increasing pressures to be held accountable for their environmental 
behavior. Along with this market pressure, companies are facing growing public 
pressures, fueled by increasing environmental awareness, in particular from expanding 
middle class, and stronger civil societies. 
 
All this provides unprecedented opportunity for environmental institutions in developing 
Asian countries to take advantage of the positive influences of globalization and public 
pressure to engage the private sector to improve its environmental performance. 
Ecolabelling is one that creatively harnesses the power of environmentally conscious 
consumers to promote higher levels of corporate environmental responsibility. By giving 
the consumer the choice of whether to buy a product contributing to environmental 
degradation or to buy more environmentally friendly alternative, this scheme aims to 
promote the production, consumption and disposal of more environmentally friendly 
products. Its voluntary nature makes eco-labelling an attractive alternative to costly 
regulatory measures. China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and Thailand are among the 
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Asian countries that have established the ecolabelling regimes.14 By supporting 
innovation in and purchasing environmentally preferable products and services, green 
government procurement is another way to change environmental behavior of producers. 
Among the OECD member countries, government procurement expenditures involve 
extremely diverse products and services and account for 8 to 25% of GDP (OECD, 2000). 
The potential for public purchasing decisions to affect the environment is therefore 
considerable.15 
 
Corporate ratings and disclosure programs, a relatively new type of instrument, rely on 
non-regulatory forces to create incentives for (mainly industrial) facilities to improve 
environmental performance. Some environmental economists call disclosure programs 
the third wave in pollution control policy after the first two waves that are legal 
regulations and market-based instruments, respectively (Tietenberg, 1998). Such 
programs will motivate polluters to reduce emissions, even in developing countries where 
regulatory infrastructures are insufficiently developed or are subjected to corruption. 
Indonesia’s National Pollution Control Agency (BAPEDAL) conceived and launched a 
program in June 1995, called PROPER – Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation and 
Rating, for rating and publicly disclosing the environmental performance of Indonesian 
factories. The PROPER develops color-coded systems to rate corporate environmental 
performance. The results of the initial ratings are shared with the companies rated, with 
those of highly environmental performance publicly congratulated. By contrast, those 
companies that are rated below the average category are privately notified and then given 
time to improve their ratings. After the grace period is over, the second rating takes place. 
This time, their ratings are revealed to the public in the presence of the media, officials 
and stakeholders. In the pilot phase of the PROPER, 187 large water polluters were rated 
in June 1995. 5 plants rated as GREEN (that is, very good) were publicly congratulated. 
The 121 firms rated as RED or BLACK, about two-thirds of the total, were privately 
notified of their ratings and given six-month grace period to clean up before public 
disclosure. One and a half years later, 5 out of the 6 plants in the worst BLACK category 
were upgraded to higher categories, and the number of plants rated as RED or BLACK, 
namely those that failed to comply with the regulations, had gone down from the two-
thirds to less than half of the total. As a result, water pollution discharges from the 187 
pilot plants fell by 40% (World Bank, 2000). The Indonesian PROPER program has since 
been expanded, and its success has caught the attention of regulators in other countries. 
Modelled on Indonesia’s PROPER program with slight modifications, the Philippines 
introduced the EcoWatch program in 1997, and China introduced the Green Watch 
program, starting in June 1999 in Zhengjiang, a relatively well-off city in Jiangsu 
Province. Just like the companies under the PROPER program, the companies under the 
EcoWatch and Green Watch programs have dramatically changed their corporate 
environmental behavior. They together have sharply reduced their pollution (World Bank, 
2000).  
 
                                                 
14 See the Global Ecolabelling Network web site at: http://gen.gr.jp. 
15 See Zhang and Assunção (2004) for further discussion on ecolabelling and green 
government procurement and concerns about their potential trade effects. 
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Investors in capital markets can also be an important ally, reacting to the disclosure of 
environmental performance related to the companies that they invest. Since 1989, the 
Ministry of the Environment (MOE) of Korea has published the Monthly Violations 
Report as news material distributed to media reporters. This Report is based on 
information gathered through monthly government inspections on about 10,000 air and 
water polluting facilities, and reports the names of companies that are in violation of 
environmental laws and regulations and the nature of enforcement actions by the MOE of 
Korea. Since November 2000, the Report is publicly disclosed through the ministry’s 
official web site. Over the period from 1992 to 2002, a total of 3,455 different facilities 
and a total of 7,073 violation events appeared on a total of 113 violation lists published 
on a monthly basis, implying that some appeared more than once in such lists. The 
econometric study using Korean company level data found that companies appearing in 
this monthly listing of the violators of Korean environmental laws and regulations 
suffered a reduction in market value of their publicly traded equities. Investors react 
negatively to the disclosure of such information either for moral reasons or because they 
believe that those offending companies will face higher clean-up costs and therefore will 
be less competitive. The average reduction in market value is estimated to be 9.7% 
(Dasgupta et al., 2004; Hong, 2005). This average reduction in market value is much 
higher than results obtained in developed countries (Canada and the United States), but of 
a similar order of magnitude as results obtained in other developing countries (Argentina, 
Chile, Mexico and the Philippines) (Dasgupta et al., 2001). Moreover, the larger or wider 
the coverage of the events by newspapers, the larger the reduction in market value, 
reaching 38% for those events covered by 5 or more newspapers (Dasgupta et al., 2004; 
Hong, 2005). 
 
This clearly demonstrates the power of public information, if communities and capital 
markets are properly informed. Therefore, environmental regulators in developing Asian 
countries should explicitly harness the public pressure and market forces by introducing 
public disclosure programs. As demonstrated in China, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
South Korea, such programs have created incentives for companies to improve their 
corporate environmental performance, and are considered as a viable option to 
complement or supplement traditional enforcement channel of fines and penalties. 
 
Drawing the support of financial institutions is also one avenue to promote improved 
corporate environmental performance. From April 1, 2007, China’s SEPA works with the 
People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank, on a new credit-evaluation system under 
which companies’ environmental compliance records are incorporated into the bank’s 
credit-evaluation system. This information will serve as a reference for commercial 
banks’ consideration of whether or not to provide loans. The bank could turn down 
requests for loans from firms with poor environmental records (Zhang, 2007a and 2007d). 
Clearly, this concerted action by the central bank and the SEPA is expected not only to 
reduce the risks borne by commercial banks, but also to encourage companies to think 
about more about the environmental effect of their operation and self-discipline their 
environmental behavior. In August 2007, the SEPA (2007b) also clearly stipulated that 
highly polluting enterprises are subject to its auditing of their environmental records in 
case these enterprises want to list shares in the Chinese stock markets or get re-financed. 
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China Securities Regulation Commission will incorporate information on their 
environmental auditing into its decision on whether or not to allow these enterprises to be 
listed or get refinanced.  
 
 
Regional Responses 
To address environmental pollution of a cross-border or global nature, it is much more 
effective for the neighboring countries concerned or all of the countries to act collectively 
than just acting on its own. To focus only on one or the other, the local or the cross-
border pollution sources, will be less effective than acting on both together. Clearly, 
regional responses serve as a complement, not a substitute for, national responses. 
 
The deteriorating air quality in Hong Kong was one of the most contentious issues in the 
vote for Hong Kong’s chief executive in March 2007. The study examining the primary 
source of the air pollution, local or cross-border, indicates that, while Hong Kong’s air 
pollution is primarily caused locally rather than cross-border pollution from its 
neighboring heavily-industrialized Chinese province of Guangdong, regional sources can 
influence this territory’s air quality on 36% of the time during the year (Lau et al., 2007). 
So, Hong Kong needs to rely on the two legs to avoid the air pollution problem 
worsening before it gets better. Hong Kong should take urgent action on its own to 
reduce emissions from local vehicles, marine traffic and power plants. In the meantime, 
Hong Kong needs to establish an agreement with its neighboring Guangdong to 
undertake a joint study to locate the source of emissions and then take concerted efforts 
together to remedy the situation. Acting on both together is much effective than focusing 
only on one or the other. 
  
A programme called ABC (Asian Brown Cloud) has been initiated with support from the 
UNEP. The main aim of the first phase of this programme is to study the impact of the 
Asian haze on a number of parameters, including monsoon change, water balance, 
agriculture and health. Scientists plan to establish a network of ground-based monitoring 
stations throughout Asia to study the composition and seasonal pattern of the haze. The 
UNEP has pledged to facilitate the continued research programme and, in the longer-term, 
to help coordinate policy responses to address the problem (UNEP, 2002). 
 
As a response to the 1997 fire event in Indonesia, the ASEAN and the ADB (Asian 
Development Bank) developed a Regional Haze Action Plan. In 2002, ASEAN 
adopted the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution,16 which took effect in 
November 2003. This Agreement is aimed to prevent and monitor transboundary haze 
pollution as a result of land and/or forest fires and to control sources of fires. Moreover, 
in recognition of the importance of cities in improving environmental sustainability, 
the ASEAN adopted the Framework for Environmentally Sustainable Cities. This 
Framework aims to address environmental sustainability challenges in the areas of 
clean air, water and land. Specifically, for example, in the area of clean air, the 
Framework is to achieve ASEAN’s long-term goal of maintaining good ambient air 
                                                 
16 Available at the ASEAN Secretariat’s web site at: http://www.aseansec.org/6086.htm. 
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quality to safeguard public health by addressing emissions from both stationary sources 
and mobile sources (ASEAN, 2003).  
 
To cope with increasing impact of acid rain, as the first step in joint regional initiative in 
East Asia, Japan proposed the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network Plan in East Asia, 
and had hosted a series of expert meetings since 1993. At its First Session of the 
Intergovernmental Meeting, held in Yokohama in March 1998, it was decided to start the 
trial operation of the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET) in 
April 1998 as regional cooperative initiative to promote efforts for environmental 
sustainability and protection of human health (Japan Environment Agency, 1999). The 
ten countries participating in the preparatory phase activities, namely, China, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Thailand and Viet 
Nam, concluded at the Second Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting in October 
2000 that the preparatory phase activities had been successful and decided to start the 
EANET activities on a regular basis from January 2001. Cambodia and Lao PDR joined 
the network in November 2001 and November 2002 respectively, and their monitoring 
activities started in 2003. Myanmar has attended EANET meetings as an observer since 
1999. Myanmar was approved as a member of EANET in November 2005. The EANET 
aims to create a common understanding of the state of the acid deposition problems in 
East Asia, to provide useful inputs for decision making at local, national and regional 
levels aimed at preventing or reducing adverse impacts on the environment caused by 
acid deposition, and to contribute to cooperation on the issues related to acid deposition 
among the participating countries. Since 2001, the data reports on the acid deposition in 
the East Asian region have been published annually and made available on the web site 
of the network.17 In South Asia, the Malé Declaration on Control and Prevention of Air 
Pollution and its likely Transboundary Effects, was adopted by the eight South Asian 
countries in 1998 (UNEP, 2002). 
 
Dust and sandstorms are plaguing Northeast Asia nearly five times as often as they were 
in the 1950s. Sandstorms that originate in the dry regions of Mongolia and the Northern 
China plain hit Beijing every spring and then move eastward toward South Korea and 
Japan. In March 2002, dust levels in Seoul, 1200 kilometers away from their sources, 
reached 2070 µg/m3 (UNEP, 2004 and 2005). To deal with dust and sandstorms, 
governments of the region are working together with the Asian Development Bank, the 
UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the UN 
Convention to Combat Desertification, and the United Nations Environment Programme 
in monitoring and early warning. A joint project has been set up to create an initial 
institutional framework and a master plan to guide regional cooperation to control dust 
and sand storms in Northeast Asia (UNEP, 2004). 
 
Asian countries are working together with the rest of the world to combat global climate 
change under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 
Kyoto Protocol. As indicated in Table 16, as of January 8, 2008, there are 2883 clean 
development mechanism (CDM) projects that are registered, in the process of registration 
                                                 
17 See the EANET web site at: http://www.eanet.cc. 
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and at the public validation stage. Asia is the largest host of CDM projects, accounting 
for about 74% of the world’s total. With 961 CDM projects at the public validation stage 
or beyond, China tops the share in the world’s total, which increases significantly from 
2.7% in August 2005 to 33.3%. If operated as planned, all these currently known CDM 
projects in China are projected to generate reduction of 1283 million tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalents by 2012, accounting for 53.0% of the world’s total estimated carbon 
credits by 2012 (Zhang, 2006b; UNEP Risoe Center, 2008).18 To put into perspective, 
this amount of the total emissions reductions by 2012 is more than the current greenhouse 
gas emissions of Germany and the Netherlands combined (or that of the United Kingdom 
and Italy combined), and corresponds to over one-quarter of the total emissions in the 
European Union. Coupled with India – the world’s second largest supplier of carbon 
credits, the two Asian giants are responsible for over two-thirds of the world’s expected 
entire emissions reductions by 2012, with China well positioned to be the largest supplier 
of carbon credits, as indicated in Figure 11. In addition, multilateral cooperation on 
climate control is taking place in this region. Noticeable example is the Asia Pacific 
Partnership for Clean Development and Climate. Australia, China, India, Japan and South 
Korea joined with the US to formally launch on January 12, 2006 this new partnership at 
its inaugural Ministerial meeting in Sydney. This partnership does not incorporate legally 
binding commitments or targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but aims to promote 
and create an enabling environment for development, diffusion, deployment and transfer 
of existing and emerging low or zero emission technologies. It established eight public-
private sector task forces (covering cleaner use of fossil energy, renewable energy and 
distributed generation, power generation and transmission, steel, aluminum, cement, coal 
mining, and buildings and appliances) to address the challenges of air pollution, energy 
security and climate change in a way that is designed to promote economic development 
and reduce poverty. The six countries represent almost half of world GDP, energy 
consumption, greenhouse gas emissions and population. Given the scale of this group and 
that technology is a critical ingredient in a climate policy package, theoretically speaking, 
the partnership has the potential to make a significant impact.19 
 
 
Table 16  Pipeline of CDM Projects at the Validation Stage or Beyond (as of 8 
January 2008) 
 
CDM Projects at 
Validation or beyond 
Projected Certified 
Emission Reductions by 
2012 
Region 
Number % Million 
tons CO2 
% 
                                                 
18 This is very in line with the economic model-based estimates of Zhang (1999, 2000, 
2001, 2004), which show that about 60% of the total CDM flows in 2010 go to China. 
19 Based on the current information available, my judgment is that this partnership can 
contribute the overall efforts, but whether it is going to deliver any substantial outcomes 
as Australian and the US governments claim remains to be seen. See Zhang (2007c) for 
further discussion on the partnership. 
 46
Latin America 
Asia & Pacific 
Europe & Central Asia 
Sub-Sahara Africa 
North Africa & Middle-East 
Total 
635 
2137 
30 
38 
43 
2883 
22.0 
74.1 
1.0 
1.3 
1.5 
100.0 
372.6 
1922.8 
17.7 
62.1 
48.2 
2423.4 
15.4 
79.3 
0.7 
2.6 
2.0 
100.0 
 
Source: UNEP Risoe Center (2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 11  Growth of Total Expected Accumulated Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs) by 2012 (as of 8 January 2008) 
Source: UNEP Risoe Center (2008). 
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To build synergies between economic growth and environmental sustainability, the 
Meeting of Ministers of the 5th Ministerial Conference on Environment and 
Development in Asia and the Pacific, held from 28 to 29 March 2005, Seoul, adopted the 
Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Development in Asia and the Pacific. This 
Declaration from government delegates from 52 member and associate member states of 
the ESCAP calls upon its members and associate members to seek to improve 
environmental sustainability, while addressing poverty by reducing the pressure of 
unsustainable economic growth on the environment and improving environmental 
performance. This Ministerial Conference also adopted the Regional Implementation 
Plan for the Sustainable Development in the Asia and the Pacific, 2006-2010. This Plan 
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provides a framework for action to address the key constraints to sustainable 
development in the context of the needs and priorities of the region (UNESCAP, 2005).   
 
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) can play a vital role in promoting clean energy, 
thus reducing environmental pollution associated with production and use of energy. 
Clean energy, including renewable energy and energy efficiency, can contribute 
significantly to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. They offer the double 
dividend, meeting the energy needs for sustained growth while at the same time 
preserving the environment. For years, MDBs have been criticized for funding 
conventional energy projects like coal-fired power plants while largely ignoring energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. This situation is changing. At the June 2004 World 
Renewable Energies Conference, the World Bank announced that it planned to increase 
its spending on clean energy by an average of 20% per year between 2005 and 2009. 
From July 2005 to June 2006, the Bank committed US$ 490 million to energy efficiency 
and US$ 190 million to renewable energy projects. This total of the US$ 680 million was 
an increase of 48% over the commitments a year ago. Jamal Saghir, Director of Energy 
and Water at the World Bank was quoted as saying that “since 1990, the World Bank 
Group commitments to renewable energy and efficiency have exceeded US$ 10 billion, 
with each dollar leveraging another three dollars from other private and public sources” 
(Cundy, 2006). The ADB is also active in this area. Its Energy Policy, approved in 1995, 
emphasizes the acceleration of the widespread application of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency in its developing member countries. This focus was strengthened in 
ADB’s Energy Policy Review of 2000. As part of its committed efforts in the area of 
clean energy, in April 2001, the ADB launched the Regional Technical Assistance for the 
Promotion of Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency and Greenhouse Gas Abatement to 
facilitate investment in renewable and energy efficiency in this region (Zhang and 
Maruyama, 2001). The Bank has increased its annual spending on clean energy to $1 
billion this year (Casey, 2007). Its Energy Efficiency Initiative, which started operation in 
July 2005, expands the ADB’s investment in projects that help developing Asian 
countries change their patterns of energy use and move towards a low carbon economy. 
The Carbon Market Initiative (CMI) is another concrete effort to deepen the ADB’s 
commitment to clean energy and climate change mitigation. The CMI provides co-
financing to develop emissions reduction projects under the Clean Development 
Mechanism, leverages debt financing and fills host country financing gaps (Rhode and 
Nicholls, 2006). As part of the CMI, the Asia Pacific Carbon Fund (APCF), which 
became fully operational on May 1, 2007, is designated to provide up-front funding 
against the purchase of an estimated 25-50% of future carbon credits expected from 
CDM projects (ADB, 2007a). It is the feature of paying its invested capital upfront that 
makes the APCF different from other carbon funds. As a result, the APCF helps projects 
close their financing gap and increases the number of clean energy and energy efficiency 
projects in Asia. By the time when the acceptance of participation to the APCF was 
closed on June 30, 2007, it raised $151.8 million from the seven European countries from 
Belgium, on behalf of the Flemish region, Finland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and Switzerland to help develop clean energy projects in the Asia Pacific region 
and at the same time to help these European countries involved to achieve their carbon 
emission reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (ADB, 2007b). 
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Regional cooperation is useful in mitigating potential environmental impacts of foreign 
direct investment (FDI). FDI is increasingly concentrated in just a few countries, 
intensifying competition for investment and thereby possibly lowering environmental 
standards in competing countries. Unlike carbon financing whereby carbon credits are 
created, which have to be scrutinized and issued by the CDM Executive Board against a 
set of sustainable development criteria (Zhang, 2006a and 2006b), FDI arrangements 
between countries are governed primarily by bilateral investment treaties. So, cooperation 
through regional economic cooperation secretariats, such as ASEAN, and the resulting 
policy coherence among countries could help countries to reduce the likelihood of 
weakening environmental standards to attract FDI.      
 
 
4. Conclusions 
Asia has been heavily dependent on dirty-burning coal to fuel its rapidly growing 
economy over the past 15 years. This coal dominance in the energy mix in developing 
Asia and inefficiencies in production and use of energy and resources, combined with 
rapid urbanization and motorization, have led to unprecedented environmental 
consequences. The ecological footprint shows that, despite the fact that one-fifth of the 
population in Asia still lives on less than US$ 1 per day (PPP-adjusted), this region is 
already living beyond its ecological carrying capacity. This situation would worsen 
because Asia needs to continue its rapid economic growth in order to alleviate the 
poverty of the two-thirds of the world’s poor living in the region. This will further place 
tremendous pressures on the environment unless vigorous and effective policies are put in 
place. The good news is that the Asian governments have endorsed an environmentally 
sustainable economic growth patterns aimed at reducing the pressure of unsustainable 
economic growth on the environment and improving environmental performance. Along 
this line, there are encouraging signs that Asian countries are taking unprecedented 
efforts. To achieve a more sustainable future for Asia, the region needs to further 
strengthen cooperation at national, local and regional levels and to have the right policy 
mix to ensure continuing economic growth without compromising its limited ecological 
carrying capacity and environmental quality.  
 
There should be better coordination between the central and local governments within 
countries. Confronted with the rising costs of environmental degradation associated with 
rapid economic growth, the central governments in Asian countries have gradually 
recognized that the conventional path of encouraging economic growth at the expense of 
the environment has to be changed. Accordingly, they set environmental goals and 
environmental performance requirements. However, environmental ministries or 
equivalent agencies in the region are often ill-equipped either to enforce existing 
regulations or to design, implement, monitor, inspect and enforce new effective 
environmental polices to fulfill their tasks. As a result, poor compliance and weak 
enforcement are common in this region. Correcting such a problem requires a major 
investment in strengthening the institutions of environmental governance to ensure that 
they have the adequate institutional, financial and technical capabilities to do the job. 
This is a necessary step, but not enough. We also need the full participation of all 
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stakeholders in protecting the environment. In this regard, local government’s 
cooperation is crucial to the overall outcomes. For example, under the current evaluation 
criterion for officials in China, local officials typically have been promoted based on how 
fast they expand their local economies. This distorted incentive system tempts officials to 
disregard environmental costs of growth. Moreover, objectively speaking, the current 
fiscal system in China plays a part in driving local governments to seek higher GDP 
growths because that system makes it hard to reconcile the interests of the central and 
local governments. Thus, we need to carefully examine those objective and subjective 
factors that lead to the lack of local official’s cooperation on the environment, and to 
provide right incentives to get their cooperation. 
 
Regulatory policies have a key role to play in reducing emissions. Setting and enforcing 
emissions standards for mobile and stationary sources and for fuel quality are essential to 
control emissions and improve air quality, and at the same time provide an impetus for 
improvements in technology. Developing Asian countries that are facing acute air 
pollution problems have adopted progressively stringent European standards for both 
vehicles and fuel specifications over time. This has led to improvements in vehicle 
technologies and exhaust systems. Many cities in Asian countries have shifted vehicle 
fleets to cleaner fuels to significantly reduce pollution from vehicles. Through prioritizing 
public transport and promoting efficient public transport systems, growing Asian cities 
are also implementing demand-side traffic management measures to reduce congestion 
and urban air pollution.  
 
Improving energy efficiency is the cheapest, fastest and most effective way to address 
environmental concerns in the short term. To encourage investments in energy efficiency 
improvements and accelerate energy efficiency gains on the demand side, Asian countries 
need to further design and promulgate efficiency standards for appliances and industrial 
equipments, building codes and new vehicle fuel economy standards. Improved energy 
efficiency increases overall air quality, reduces greenhouse gas emissions and improves 
energy security. Given that many developing Asian countries suffer frequently from 
energy shortages, increasing energy efficiency will reduce the need to invest in energy-
supply infrastructures but will bring energy needs and supplies into balance. Moreover, 
because many Asian economies are exports-oriented, reducing energy use through greater 
efficiency will reduce energy costs and thus enhance their international competitiveness. 
There are encouraging signs that Asian countries are taking unprecedented efforts to 
improve energy efficiency. However, from a long-term perspective, widespread use of 
clean energy is a real solution. In comparison with the OECD, the share of renewable 
energies (including traditional biomass) in the total primary energy supply in developing 
Asian countries is very high, but their share of hydropower and modern (or new) 
renewable energies (namely, solar, wind, geothermal, wave and tidal energy) in total 
renewables is very low, although this share of modern renewable energies in the energy 
mix is growing in developing Asian countries. Increasing this share not only enhances 
energy security, but also is environmentally friendly and conducive to good health. Many 
Asian countries have established national targets for renewable energies. These targets 
are revised and strengthened over time. To meet these targets, governments need to put in 
place policies and incentives favorable to the widespread use of renewable energies. Such 
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policies include public RD&D programs, feed-in tariffs, renewable energy mandates, tax 
credits for investment/production, preferential loans, accelerated depreciation rates, 
technology-forcing regulations, reduction on import duty and export facilitation, 
consumer purchasing incentives and government green purchasing preferences, green 
certificate trading, and competitive bidding. However, the specific form and level of this 
support will clearly differ in design from technology to technology and from country to 
country, depending on the overall policy framework in place and the maturity and cost of 
each technology in each country. 
 
Multilateral development banks can play a vital role in promoting clean energy, thus 
reducing environmental pollution associated with production and use of energy. For years, 
they have been criticized for funding conventional energy projects like coal-fired power 
plants while largely ignoring energy efficiency and renewable energy. There are 
encouraging signs that this situation is changing, but such a change is not at the pace and 
on the scale that we need. Multilateral development banks need to further strengthen their 
financial commitments to and technical support for accelerating such a change. 
 
Having the right economic policies is crucial because it sends clear signals to both 
producers and consumers of energy. This region needs to get rid of energy subsidies, 
which have been reduced over time but still exist in a number of countries, in order to 
provide incentives for efficient fuel use and adoption of clean technologies that reduce 
emissions at sources. But removing such subsidies is but a first step in getting the energy 
prices right. Further steps include incorporating the costs of resources themselves to 
reflect their scarcity and internalizing the costs of externalities. Market-based instruments, 
such as pollution charges, green taxes, tradeable petmits, and penalties for infringing on 
environmental regulations, are common ways to internalize externality costs into the 
market prices. Many Asian countries have traditionally relied on rigid command-and-
control approaches. With the poor environmental performance of such approaches and 
the cost and complexity associated with their implementation, an increasing number of 
countries in this region are implementing market-based policy instruments. The latter are 
seen to increase not only cost-effectiveness but also flexibility in complying with the set 
environmental regulations. In addition, governments need to explore industrial policies to 
promote industrial upgrading and energy conservation. For example, China levied export 
taxes on energy- and resource-intensive products to discourage exports that rely heavily 
on energy and resources and to save scarce energy and resources, eliminated or cut export 
tax rebates for 2831 exported items including 553 “highly energy-consuming, highly 
polluting and resource intensive products”, and suspends the rights of those enterprises 
that don’t meet their environmental obligations to engage foreign trade in the period of 
more than one year and less than three years.  
 
Developing Asian countries are confronted with many other pressing social pressing 
concerns such as providing water and sanitation services to the urban poor, improving 
public transportation and other basic infrastructures, and reducing poverty as well as 
improving the environment. In this context, in order to address environmental issues 
effectively and achieve the maximal gains, environmental policies need to be integrated 
with economic policies, investment policies, energy policies, transportation policies, 
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land-use policies, and other urban development policies. This will help countries view 
environmental policies as not just for tackling potential environmental threats per se, but 
as an integrated framework to tackle these aforementioned concerns, as well as a means 
of improving energy efficiency, reducing congestions, saving money, and setting pro-
active policies to ensure sustainable development. Moreover, to minimize environmental 
effects, such an integration needs to be in place at the planning stage, rather than at the 
implementation stage.  
 
The active engagement of the private sector is essential for success, not simply because 
the expected investment requirements are too massive for the public sector. After all, the 
firms themselves are entities that use natural resources, make products and emit pollution. 
Thus, a sustainable future for Asia is not possible without the active engagement of the 
private sector. Environmental institutions in developing Asian countries need to take 
advantage of the positive influences of globalization and public pressure to engage the 
private sector through e.g., ecolabelling, green government procurement, corporate 
ratings and disclosure programs, and drawing the support of financial institutions to 
promote long-lasting, improved corporate energy-saving and environmental performance. 
 
The clean development mechanism is an innovative mechanism built into the Kyoto 
Protocol. The CDM allows industrialized countries to generate emission credits through 
investment in emission reduction projects in developing countries to meet their Kyoto 
emission obligations while helping developing countries to meet their sustainable 
development objectives. Initially, Asia lagged behind Latin America in the CDM market. 
But thanks to the increasing number of CDM projects in China and India, Asia is now the 
largest host of CDM projects. While the CDM has emerged as a financing mechanism to 
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions as the implementation of CDM projects has 
progressed, it still does not work to full potential scale. To that end, change needs to take 
place both at national and international levels. At the national level, for those developing 
Asian countries that have not truly benefited from the CDM, they need to put in place 
clear institutional structures, streamlined and transparent CDM procedures and sound 
governance of clearer lines of responsibility and functions to facilitate the smooth 
implementation of CDM projects in their countries. At the international level, post-Kyoto 
climate negotiations need to reform the CDM to overcome its current structural 
limitations and to make it accommodate those players and types of small projects that 
have been left out to date. When taken together and combined, they will help to expand 
the number and geographical reach of the CDM, thus spreading its benefits to more 
countries.   
  
It should be kept in mind that broad economic reforms can also help to reduce pollution 
and save energy. As many Asian countries are based on export-oriented economies, 
greater openness to trade and the elimination of trade barriers between and inside 
countries can enhance incentives for companies to adopt more efficient and 
environmentally friendly technologies. As trade liberalization progresses, companies are 
facing ever-increasing pressures to be held accountable for their environmental behavior. 
Moreover, state-owned companies in this region are often heavy polluters, so 
decentralization and privatization to have such companies accountable for their profits 
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and costs can contribute to cleaner production. But economic reforms are no panacea. 
Governments also need to anticipate and deal with potential environmental effects of 
such growth-promoting measures before and after they have been taken. 
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that, with environmental quality in Asia becoming 
increasingly affected by pollution from neighboring countries or elsewhere, there is a 
clear need for better coordination across countries. To address environmental pollution of 
a cross-border or global nature, it is much more effective either for the neighboring 
countries concerned or all of the countries to act collectively rather than having each 
country simply act on its own. To focus on only one or the other, the local or the cross-
border pollution sources, will be less effective than acting on both together. Clearly, there 
also needs to be a template for cooperation on trans-bounder or global environmental 
issues. Some progress has been made in this area. For example, as a response to the 1997 
fire event in Indonesia, the ASEAN and the ADB developed a Regional Haze Action 
Plan, and in 2002, ASEAN adopted the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. 
Moreover, in recognition of the importance of cities in improving environmental 
sustainability, the ASEAN adopted the Framework for Environmentally Sustainable 
Cities to address environmental sustainability challenges in the areas of clean air, water 
and land. Governments of the Asian countries are working together to deal with dust and 
sandstorms and to cope with the increasing negative impact of acid rain. Asian countries 
are also working together with the rest of the world to combat global climate change 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto 
Protocol. These regional and international responses are not a substitute for national 
responses. Rather, they serve as a useful complement for national responses.  
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